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INTRODUCTION

The foundation for the American patent system is purely
economic. The entire system stems from a constitutional grant
of power to Congress to promote the useful arts, not to protect a
constitutional right.1 Although rights-based theories do influence debates about intellectual property theory in general, the
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consensus among those studying the American patent system is
to focus on utilitarian approaches.2
Similarly, the primary impact of the American patent system is economic as well. Although evidenced by infringement
2. The rights-based theories are deontological, protection-based theories,
often called “natural law” theories. The utilitarian theories are consequentialist, promotion-based theories, often called various “incentive” theories. One
reason for the persistence of both sets of theories, at least in the American
context, is the Constitution itself, which grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” Id. On the one hand, the clause does at least contain the concept of securing or protecting. Indeed, this clause is the only clause in the entire unamended Constitution that contains the word “right.” From time to
time, some have unsuccessfully argued that the mandate is to protect a fundamental constitutional right. On the other hand, in this so-called Patent and
Copyright Clause, the central and operative verb is “promote,” and for trademarks, the constitutional source of Congressional power is the Commerce
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Whereas the rights-based views do
exert some influence, American intellectual property law is dominantly shaped
by utilitarian views, with a debate remaining over which utilitarian view
should prevail. Although this Article refers only to the debate among utilitarian views, there is equal debate among the various protection-based views.
Both sides of that debate agree that the patent right is a natural right, but
they disagree about whether it belongs to the inventor or to society as a whole.
In keeping with the teachings of Locke, some argue that by mixing one’s labor
with an invention, one owns the invention as a just reward. See JOHN LOCKE,
The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 30320 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (setting forth
Locke’s “just desserts” or “labor” theory). In keeping with the teachings of
Hegel, others argue that inventions are so imbued with the labor and personhood of the inventor that they fundamentally belong to the individual inventor
in much the same way that freedom and personal space are considered fundamental rights.
See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY 44-48 (1993) (discussing Hegel’s “personhood” theory). Yet those
natural rights theories tying invention to inventor leave many questions unanswered. Assuming inventions are the natural property of the inventor,
what rights do simultaneous inventors have? Should independent origination
be a complete defense to patent infringement as it is for copyright infringement? More fundamentally, should the patent right include some affirmative
right to use? Alternatively, some natural rights theories tie inventions to society. In keeping with the teachings of Thomas Jefferson, some argue that because one’s use of knowledge does not interfere with the use by another,
knowledge must be a fundamental right of society. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in JEFFERSON
WRITINGS 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas Jefferson] (“He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper
at mine, receives light without darkening me.”). See generally DONALD S.
CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN & F.
SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1-50 (1998) (reviewing the history
and philosophy of patent law and collecting sources).
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verdicts reaching well into the hundreds of millions of dollars,3
the importance of the patent system cannot be measured
merely in individual gains and losses. Economic research has
shown that the national patent system has an important impact on long term international economic competitiveness and
that patent law can function as a public policy tool for promoting national economic growth.4
3. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (describing the $1.2 billion jury verdict), vacated, 520 U.S. 1111
(1997); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1634-MA, 1991 WL 4087,
at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991) (awarding approximately $900 million in lost
profits, royalties, and interest).
4. See, e.g., Symposium on Patents and Technology Licensing, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 103 (1990) (discussing the use of patent law as a tool to promote innovation and national economic development). Economic research over the
past sixty years has amply established a causal link between the development
of intellectual property and the growth of our national economy, while also
showing that intellectual property is an increasingly critical component of
United States capital and foreign trade. See generally NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, R & D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY (Zvi Griliches ed.,
1984) (describing invention and technological change as major forces of growth
in national economies and studying their connection to patents); Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987) (discussing
patents as tools for appropriating returns to investments in making and commercializing inventions); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986) (describing the empirical evidence for
the link between patents and innovation); Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use
of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (Mitchell B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (describing the impact of intellectual property rights and their enforcement on
the processes of invention commercialization); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty
and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10–12 (1992) (discussing the impact of patents on firms’ research and development investment decisions). Much of this work is based on the literature that explores the general
importance of innovation to the growth of national economies. See, e.g., SIMON
S. KUZNETS, SECULAR MOVEMENTS IN PRODUCTION AND PRICES 1-58 (1930)
(economic research showing a causal link between invention and technical
change and the growth of national economies); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 1
BUSINESS CYCLES 84-102 (1939) (same) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS
CYCLES]; Robert K. Merton, Fluctuations in the Rate of Industrial Invention,
49 Q.J. ECON. 454, 464 (1935) (same); GEOFFREY WYATT, THE ECONOMICS OF
INVENTION 147-231 (1986) (reviewing the field of economic literature on the
connection between invention and technical change and the growth of national
economies); Zvi Griliches, Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm
Level in the 1970’s, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 141, 151-53 (1986) (more recent economic research showing the same causal link). All of this research has roots
in Solow’s Nobel Prize winning work, which demonstrated that most of the
economic growth in the United States in the first half of this century could be
explained by investments in research and development and education rather
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Although the existence of the patent system’s impact is beyond dispute, the exact nature of this impact remains a topic of
significant debate.5 Proponents of the system credit it with bolstering the national economy by fostering invention and its
commercialization.6 Detractors of the system argue that alternatives would do an even better job and should therefore be
used instead.7
Specific foci of this general debate have recently emerged
around several controversial trends in the patent system that
have attracted great attention in the legal, technology, economics, and business communities. For example, some question
changes in the patent system that are perceived to have increased predictability in patent litigation and certainty in patent law, such as the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 and several areas of that
court’s case law.8 Others question the now routine use of patthan by increases in capital and labor. See Robert M. Solow, Technical
Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312,
320 (1957). Solow’s work is extended in this connection by Romer, who argues
that such investment in research and development and education is unlike
other forms of investment in that it does not experience decreasing returns to
scale. See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long–Run Growth, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 1002, 1003 (1986). The more one puts in, the more one gets out,
and the “bang for the buck” does not decrease as more and more bucks are
added.
5. See, e.g., 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMICS OF
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 1-129 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe eds., 1986)
(presenting the views of multiple authors critically reviewing economic theories about the merits of a patent system); see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2,
at 50-72 (collecting sources and reviewing economic theories about how the
patent system operates).
6. See, e.g., 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMICS OF
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 5, at 1-129 (collecting and reviewing
arguments by proponents of the patent system).
7. See, e.g., id. (collecting and reviewing arguments by detractors of the
patent system).
8. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market
Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 986-89 (1999)
(criticizing recent increases in certainty in patent law due to the Federal Circuit’s expanded use of preliminary injunctions and the other courts’ adherence
to the property right view of patents as an absolute right to exclude); see also
infra Part II.C. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982,
has jurisdiction over appeals in all patent cases throughout the country, regardless of whether they arise from trials in the federal district courts or from
proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982) (creating a unified forum for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit by merging the
Court of Claims with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and transfer-
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ents to protect subject matter that many previously considered
to be ineligible for patent protection, such as living organisms,
gene fragments, computer software, and financial services.9
ring to the new court jurisdiction over appeals from patent cases that were
tried in the district courts). The creation of such a unified forum for patent
appeals was not without debate. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Creation
of the Federal Circuit, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 29 (providing discussion by a former Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner about the impact
of the Federal Circuit on efforts to bring certainty and stability to U.S. patent
law); cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1989) (discussing contested issues
surrounding the creation of the Federal Circuit). Indeed, the Federal Circuit
has increased certainty in the patent system in general through landmark decisions in several discrete areas of the court’s case law and has consistently
reaffirmed the nature of the patent right as a property right, with an absolute
right of exclusion that is clearly defined and marked by clear and fixed
boundaries. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding the construction of patent claims to be a question of law, not fact, and subject to de novo
review by only one intermediate court of appeals, the Federal Circuit); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-85 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing strict recipe for the use of various forms of evidence in construing patent
claims); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 833 F.2d 930, 931 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (refusing to stay an injunction pending appeal after recognizing that the
public policy interest in protecting rights secured by the patent outweighs the
public demand for increased quantity of a good presently covered by a patent);
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212-13 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(applying the statutory requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the text of the
patent application as filed contain sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art
to make and use whatever is covered by patent claims as eventually issued);
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding
that 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires the text of the patent application as filed to satisfy the separate and distinct written description requirement so as to reasonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the patent claims
as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (applying a separate
written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Fiers
v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (solidifying the court’s position on a separate written description requirement); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (solidifying further
the court’s position on a separate written description requirement); Lockwood
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the
same written description requirement to the field of computer software); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that the written description requirement is not limited to complex
technologies and applies equally to simple technologies, like sofa recliners); see
also infra text accompanying notes 115, 170.
9. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698-701
(1998) (criticizing the availability and use of patents on gene fragments and
other biological materials); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (criticizing the expanding use of patents in ecommerce); Seth Shulman, Software Patents Tangle the Web, TECH. REV.
Mar./Apr. 2000, at 68 (discussing the technology community’s views on the
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In reaction to these recent trends in the patent system,
several critics have suggested that the system’s goals can be
better achieved by implementing a variety of approaches that
avoid or mitigate the potentially output-restricting monopolytype impact of property rights. Suggested approaches include
cash rewards,10 buy-outs,11 and the use of liability rules,12 as
distinct from property rules. This article uses the important
pros and cons of software patents); William Falloon, Patent Power: Who Owns
the Ideas that Drive Derivatives, RISK, Dec. 1999, at 22 (discussing the story
behind Columbia University’s patent for the quasi-Monte Carlo method of
valuing derivatives and the financial community’s views on the larger debate
over financial patents); see also infra text accompanying notes 112-15, 203-12.
See generally CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 729-893 (reviewing shifts in patent law’s requirements of utility and statutory subject matter and collecting
diverse commentaries from legal, technology, and business communities defending and criticizing these shifts). Today, as a matter of positive law, there
is no per se exception to patents on living things, computer software, or business methods. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (holding
that living organisms are patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 176 (1981) (“A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula,
computer program, or digital computer.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that a computer system for producing a
smooth waveform on a raster display is patentable subject matter); State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (holding that a hub and spoke
mutual fund accounting system is patentable subject matter).
10. See generally, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE,
REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 6956 (1999) (suggesting a system of
government-sponsored cash rewards instead of or in addition to a system of
patents and highlighting advantages of such a system to fields where the disparity between average cost and marginal cost is typically large, citing in particular fields previously considered by some to be largely ineligible for patent
protection, like modern biotechnology products and computer software). For
further discussion of the cash rewards system, see infra Part I.
11. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL KREMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A
MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 6304 (1997) (suggesting a system in which the
government buys out patents after conducting an auction to determine an appropriate buy-out price and highlighting advantages of such a system to fields
where the disparity between average cost and marginal cost is typically large,
citing in particular fields previously considered by some to be largely ineligible
for patent protection, like modern biotechnology products and the design of
computer chips). For further discussion of the cash rewards system, see infra
Part I.
12. See, e.g., Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 1020-23 (suggesting
that patents be enforced through liability rules, under which infringement is
permitted but generates a damage award to rights-holders, instead of property
rules, under which rights-holders enjoy an absolute right to enforce their
rights through injunctions); see also infra Part II.C.

KIEFF.FNL

1/15/01 3:35 PM

2001] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RULES

703

contributions made by these commentators to reveal shortcomings in any view of the patent system that focuses only on incentives to engage in inventive activity.13
This Article offers a new view of the patent system that
embraces property rights and property rules as essential elements for achieving core goals of the patent system, and forges
a surprising link among disparate features of the system previously considered to be unrelated or even mutually antithetical.14 According to this view, the treatment of patents as property rights is necessary to facilitate investment in the complex,
costly, and risky commercialization activities required to turn
nascent inventions into new goods and services.15 Furthermore, property treatment is equally necessary to help society
decide which inventive activities are worth protecting in the
first instance.16
Such a commercialization view not only reveals how the recently suggested alternatives17 fail to address these important
goals of the patent system and would actually frustrate them18
but it also shows how the current system already addresses the
concerns raised by such commentary.19 This Article argues
that the power to restrict use that is conferred by a patentee’s
property right20 and the strict enforcement of this right with a
property rule, rather than a liability rule,21 are paradoxically
essential to avoiding underuse. This Article also argues that
the ability to use price discrimination to avoid the dead-weight
loss potentially caused by a property owner’s power over price22
13. See discussion infra Part I.
14. See discussion infra Parts I-II.
15. See discussion infra Part I.A.
16. See discussion infra Part I.B.
17. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
18. See discussion infra Part I.
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B. Dead-weight loss refers to the loss in
potential social wealth when a competitive market is compared to an otherwise identical market in which there is monopoly power, or power over price.
In a competitive market for a product, society is made better off by sales of
such a product through the creation of both a producer surplus and a consumer surplus. These forms of surplus can be understood through an example
in which there is an efficient market for ice cream cones and a wealthy adult
and an average child each consuming the same size cone in that market. The
market sets the price for the cone. Although the child may value the cone at
about its price, the wealthy adult may value the cone much more than the
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and the ability to use patents as tools for avoiding or challenging monopolies23 are essential to explaining the perceived
paradox of strong patent laws persisting in the face of antitrust
laws.
This Article further shows how the commercialization
view’s link among patents, property rights, and price discrimination also operated to inform and motivate the framers of our
current patent system.24 This Article then shows how such a
commercialization view may help explain many controversial
trends in the existing patent system, including those that
sparked the recent critical commentary.25 This view also helps
explain similar controversial trends in other intellectual property regimes such as trademarks.26

price. Each consumer receives a benefit for exchanging money for cone, which
is why the exchange is made voluntarily, but some consumers may value the
exchanged good substantially above the exchange price. Consumer surplus
represents the aggregate amount that all consumers in the market are made
better off by the exchanges made at market price. More specifically, consumer
surplus is the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what
they actually pay. In contradistinction, producer surplus is the difference between what a producer collects as payment for the good, the market price, and
the marginal cost of producing that good. In this simple market, social surplus is the amount that producers and consumers in aggregate are made better off for having made the market exchange. In more dynamic and complex
models, social surplus also includes any positive benefit that may flow to those
who are external to the two-person exchange, so-called positive externalities.
Kremer and Shavell and van Ypersele point out that the patent owner may
not be able to capture the full social surplus of the invention because some will
be enjoyed by others as consumer surplus or positive externalities. See
KREMER, supra note 11, at 1; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 5-6.
They also argue that some of the social surplus will be lost due to the monopoly power wielded by a patentee. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1; SHAVELL &
VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 5-6. In a typical monopoly market, the monopolist restricts output so that a higher price can be charged. This shift in
price and output causes some consumer surplus in the competitive market to
become producer surplus, thereby making the monopolist better off than under
the competitive market. The shift also causes some consumer surplus and
some producer surplus to be lost. This combined loss is the so-called deadweight loss of a monopoly market and represents a net decrease in social surplus due to the shift from competitive to monopoly markets. For a more detailed discussion of the comparison between monopoly and competitive markets in the context of inventions, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 50-58.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 199-202.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See discussion infra Part V.
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I. PROBLEMS WITH REWARD ALTERNATIVES TO
PATENTS
Some critics of the patent system have argued that permitting inventors to leverage the patent right to exclude in exchange for royalties (or injunctions and damages) is a sloppy
reward for inventive effort.27 The inventor may be unable to
recoup the full social surplus created by the invention.28 For
example, the lure of market power may cause investment in inventive activity to exceed social surplus.29 And the patent’s
power to restrict output and raise price may create dead-weight
loss.30 Instead, Shavell and van Ypersele,31 and Kremer,32
among others, offer different systems designed to improve the
match between social surplus and the amount an inventor will
recoup while simultaneously avoiding the patent’s potential
power over price and its commensurate dead-weight loss.
These critics offer two alternatives to the current patent system. The general features of the offered alternatives are first
outlined individually below. The details of their implications
are subsequently discussed together.
Shavell and van Ypersele suggest a system of cash rewards
paid by the government to inventors.33 Under this system, in27. See, e.g., KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE,
supra note 10, at 1-8. Technological progress is a complex and multi-step
process. To be sure, the act of inventing is essential, but it is only one of the
early steps in the process. At a minimum, members of society other than the
original inventor must receive some benefit from nascent inventions before society at large can be considered to have enjoyed technological progress. Such
benefit may be in the form of information about the invention, a product of the
invention, or a useful embodiment of the invention. The collective act of
transmitting benefit from nascent inventions to those other than the inventor
is here referred to as commercialization. This Article offers a view of the patent system that is tied to commercialization, rather than to inventing. For
more on the commercialization process itself, see discussion infra Part I.A.
28. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra
note 10, at 1-8. Social surplus is the amount of total social welfare generated
by the invention less the costs of making the invention, such as research by
the inventor and the inventor’s competitors. Social welfare is the aggregate
value of all utility that individuals obtain from the invention.
29. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra
note 10, at 1-8.
30. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra
note 10, at 1-8.
31. See SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1-8 (suggesting the
government give cash rewards instead of or in addition to patents).
32. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5 (suggesting the government step in
to buy out patents after they have been issued).
33. See SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1.
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ventions pass immediately into the public domain, becoming
freely available to all.34 The government would then set the
amount of reward based on information about demand in the
form of actual sales data gathered after the invention is
made.35 Importantly, Shavell and van Ypersele demonstrate
that the government’s use of actual sales data gathered after
an invention is made will most likely yield better information
about demand than any special knowledge possessed by the inventor before deciding whether to engage in the inventive activity.36 Shavell and van Ypersele conclude that a patent system
does not enjoy any fundamental advantage over a reward system.37 They further conclude that a mixed system under which
the innovator is allowed to seek either a patent or a reward is
superior to a system offering only patents.38
Kremer similarly suggests a system in which the government pays patentees to return their patents to the public domain.39 He calls this a system of patent buy-outs.40 As in the
Shavell and van Ypersele system, patents that have been
bought out under Kremer’s system will pass immediately into
the public domain with their claimed inventions becoming
freely available to all.41 Under Kremer’s system, the government would use an auction to estimate the private value of patents.42 The government would buy out most patents put to auction, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their true
evaluations, a few patents would be sold to bidders.43 Because
bidders would not know which patents would be purchased,
they would have incentives to value them all honestly.44
Kremer concludes that it is impossible to know based on theory
alone whether patent buy-outs would provide a useful supple34. See id. Shavell and van Ypersele propose that instead of granting a
patent, the government should pay a cash reward funded by general tax revenues. Id. Because the heart of the patent right is the right to exclude, see 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994), absent patents, everyone would be free to make and
use the invention, unless of course there existed prohibitions from other areas
of law, such as food and drug or environmental law.
35. See SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 21-22.
36. See id. at 22.
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id.
39. KREMER, supra note 11, at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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ment to the existing patent system.45 However, he recommends
a limited trial to better evaluate the proposal.46
Before unpacking the detailed implications of these two
proposed alternatives to the patent system, it must be recognized that they are offered through substantial papers presenting mathematical economic models that do elucidate several
larger issues. Most importantly, the models demonstrate that
rewardswhether cash, praise, or otherwise, and whether
given by the government or a private actorcan operate like
patents as tools for promoting inventive activity. This Article
does not address the relative strengths of the many available
tools for promoting inventive activity. Rather, the section that
follows addresses the relative strengths of rewards and patents
in promoting the larger process of technological progress
through invention commercialization.
A. COMMERCIALIZATION
Any system focused on rewarding inventive effort, when an
actual good or service is brought to the market, runs the risk of
failing to address the activities that take place after an invention is made but before it can be profitably exploited.47 The in45. Id. at 46. As an alternative to the proposed cash reward and buy-out
systems, the government could act through the tax system by providing a tax
credit, for example. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
AND
OF
INNOVATION
COMMERCIALIZATION
EMERGING
CONGRESS,
TECHNOLOGY 90-94 (1995) [hereinafter INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY] (discussing the influence of tax and credit provisions on invention commercialization).
46. INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 45, at 90-94.
47. See id. at 3, 20-96 (collecting sources and setting forth as principle
findings and describing in detail how successful commercialization is not simply a matter of developing technology first or getting to market first, but instead requires intellectual property protection to create an environment conducive to securing complimentary assets, skills, capital, manufacturing,
marketing, and support); cf. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 62-72 (collecting
sources and reviewing diverse incentive theories of the patent system including “incentive to invent,” “incentive to disclose,” “incentive to commercialize,”
and “incentive to design around”). The incentive to commercialize theory discussed herein is similar in some respects to the “prospect” theory elucidated by
Kitch, which views the patent as important in providing incentives for investment in increasing the value of a patented technology. See Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77
(1977). The view offered in this Article is not critical of the approach offered
by Kitch. Instead, this Article offers an alternative to Kitch’s analysis that
links together three different sets of literature not addressed in his work and
not previously interconnected: the patent law and economics literature leading
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vention must be developed into some commercial embodiment.48 Capital may have to be raised.49 Production facilities
and labor must be made available.50 Distribution channels
must be created.51 Consumers must be educated about the existence and benefits of this new good or service.52 Each of these
activities requires investment from the holder of the invention,
and many others, such as product development teams, investment bankers, venture capitalists, labor sources, and advertisers.53 As each of these people moves into action to make such
investments (so-called first movers), there may be numerous
other market participants (so-called second movers) who subsequently move to compete at each step of the larger endeavor.
Some of the costs borne by a first mover also would be borne by
any second mover. Some costs, however, will be borne only by
the first mover, because once incurred they will yield benefits
for the entire class of competitors, embracing first movers and
second movers.54
Second movers generally enjoy numerous advantages over
the first movers against whom they compete.55 Consider, for
up to the framing of the present patent system that is codified in the 1952
Patent Act, see discussion infra Part III; the law and economics literature on
property rights and property rules, like that of Demsetz, see discussion infra
Part II; and the component of the contemporary law and economics literature
that is critical of recent trends in the patent system, like that discussed infra
in Parts I-II. This Article also resurfaces the important screening, see infra
text accompanying notes 71-78, and potential monopoly-challenging, see infra
text accompanying notes 199-202, functions of the present patent. The commercialization label is used here in deference to its use by the framers of the
current patent system around the time the system was drafted. See discussion
infra Part III. See also infra text accompanying note 189 (using “commercialize” label).
48. INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 45, at 3, 20-96.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 61-94 (1983) (discussing the important role of market power
like that afforded by a patent’s right to exclude in organizing invention
commercialization activity) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 81-110 (3d ed. 1950) (same) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY]; SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES,
supra note 4, at 84-192 (same).
54. See id.
55. See id. See generally Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardiza-
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example, that a second mover’s mere knowledge of a first
mover’s success eliminates a great deal of risk from the second
mover’s decision whether to embark on the same enterprise.56
The mere knowledge that a problem has been solved may provide psychological motivation to attempt a solution.57 In addition, successfully developed products and distribution channels
are by their nature difficult to keep secret and can serve as
working models for competitors to follow, thereby saving them
the cost of weeding out worse alternatives.58 Furthermore, the
costs of capital will decline throughout the industry because investors will become educated about its specific risks and potential for profit.59 Similarly, the education of consumers and
arousal of consumer demand will benefit all competitors
equally.60 Indeed, the arrival of a competitor into the market
will force the first mover to incur added costs of brand advertising, on top of the costs of more general product advertising already incurred.61

tion, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND. J. ECON. 70, 75-79 (1985) (describing second-mover advantages); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and
Lemmings, in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 1 (H.
Landis Gabel ed., 1987) (providing illustrative examples of second-mover advantages).
56. See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 149 (1989) (discussing the value of information in reducing
uncertainty generally).
57. This may be due in part to risk aversion. See id. at 139 (discussing
attitudes toward risk). At the least, it is often easier to solve a problem once it
is known to be solvable.
58. Trade secrecy is not a viable means for protecting anything that can
be easily reverse engineered. Cf. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1971) (drawing a distinction between information voluntarily disclosed for which there is no trade secret protection
and the use of industrial espionage to improperly peer into a competitor’s
trade secret safe).
59. See
INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 45, at 3, 20-96.
60. This type of second-mover advantage can be mitigated by the first
mover’s proper trademark use, in which the mark is always accompanied by a
generic description.
See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 4:2.1[A] (1999) (discussing the importance of proper
trademark use in avoiding possible loss of rights in the mark by letting it become a generic term).
61. Investments in brand name recognition and consumer goodwill are
typically stored in a company’s trademarks, which indicate to consumers that
the marked products come only from one particular source. See id. § 1:1.1 (describing trademarks as identifiers of source and vessels of goodwill).
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The patent right to exclude competitors who have not
shared in bearing these initial costs provides incentives for the
holder of the invention and the other players in this market to
come together and incur all costs necessary to facilitate commercialization of the patented invention.62 Therefore, although
a simple reward for inventive effort might provide adequate incentives for invention itself, the nascent invention may never
reach a single consumer without the above incentives to commercialize.63
The Shavell and van Ypersele system seems to contemplate
that at least some amount of commercialization will be allowed
to take place because the amount of reward is to be based on
data from actual sales.64 But their suggested system does not
make clear how far along the commercialization chain the invention must have progressed before a reward will accrue. The
reward will fail to provide incentives for complete commercialization if a right to it is given too soon after the completion of
invention and commencement of commercialization.65
If the moment of entitlement to the reward is pushed later
along the commercialization timeline, then the reward will
generate some bad, rent-dissipating effects. Rent dissipation
occurs when the lure of a reward causes too many individuals
62. The patentee, and indeed anyone who has incurred such initial costs,
will want to charge a price for the invention or its embodiments that includes
both the marginal cost of producing each additional unit of output as well as
these fixed costs of initial development. A second mover who has not incurred
such initial costs will be able to charge a lower price that is based only on the
marginal cost of producing each additional unit of output. Without the right
to exclude, the patentee would also have to charge this lower price as well or
lose all sales to the competitor. Because the patent right to exclude allows the
patentee to charge the higher price, the availability of this right provides incentives for the holder of the invention to incur these costs. The ability to obtain an assignment or license from the patentee similarly provides incentives
for the other players in the market to incur such costs, in a cooperative fashion. Optimally, each step in the commercialization process is carried out by
the lowest cost provider of that service.
63. The suggested reward alternatives do not explain how a reward system would operate in practice. More particularly, it is not clear how soon after
the invention is made the reward would be given or the right to a reward
would attach. If the right to a reward attaches immediately after the invention is made, then the reward will only provide incentives for inventive activity and not incentives for commercialization.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
65. It is not clear that any individual will have adequate incentives to invest in commercializing an invention for which a reward, and not a patent, has
been issued if the right to the reward attaches to the one who completes the
invention.
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to engage in the rewarded activity.66 Some rent dissipation
may be due to an increase in the size of the reward.67 In the
case of rewards for inventions, as the entitlement to the reward
is pushed later along the commercialization timeline, the size of
the reward will have to increase to cover the costs of some
commercialization activity in addition to inventive activity.
The shift down the commercialization timeline of the entitlement to the reward will also increase the uncertainty over
who will be a reward recipient. As this uncertainty increases,
the invention-inducing power of the reward may decrease, or
the undesirable rent-dissipating power may increase. The desirable, invention-inducing power of the reward may decrease
because each individual would-be inventor may find the possibility of reward to be too low to induce investment in the inventing enterprise.
Alternatively, the undesirable, rentdissipating power may increase as the increase in uncertainty
causes even more individuals to gamble on inventive activity in
the hopes of winning the reward.68
Shavell and van Ypersele argue that the patent system and
the reward system both face equal problems with such rent dissipation.69 While both systems may induce a race at the invention stage, however, the race under a reward system in which
the entitlement to reward attaches late in the commercialization process will continue through the commercialization stage.
66. For example, the possibility of winning a reward for inventing may
induce more than the optimal number of people to incur the costs of attempting to invent. As a result, although each individual may rationally decide to
make such an attempt because the reward is greater than that individual’s
private costs, so many individuals may make attempts that the aggregate
costs of inventing may exceed the invention’s social surplus. See generally
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA.
L. REV. 305 (1992) (discussing rent-seeking, and therefore rent-dissipating,
behavior surrounding inventions). Under the present patent system, in cases
where an invention has been independently invented by more than one person,
only one inventor, if any, may receive a patent for that invention. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (setting forth the statutory basis for contests over priority of invention called “interferences”).
67. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 66, at 321 (discussing the connection between the size of reward and the extent of rent dissipation).
68. This seemingly irrational behavior may occur for the same reason that
individuals decide to buy lottery tickets. The decision to buy lottery tickets is
irrational if the calculation only includes cost of ticket and benefit associated
with the likelihood of cash reward. The decision may be rational if it takes
into account the psychological benefit some people enjoy from simply buying a
ticket even in the face of poor odds.
69. SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 23.
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The rent-dissipating impact that results will also be worse.
Thus, as compared with a reward system, the patent system
may be not only better able to improve coordination among
market players engaged in the invention commercialization
process, it also may be better able to avoid rent dissipation.70
The reward alternatives, however, face additional problems
beyond coordination and rent dissipation. The problem of identifying reward recipients is itself a significant problem. As discussed in the next section, the problem of selecting reward recipients reveals both a significant practical hurdle to the
implementation of reward systems and a particularly elegant
feature of the patent system.
B. SCREENING
A central flaw in reward systems is their failure to address
the important role played in the current system by competitors
of the patentee. The threat of an injunction by a federal court
draws a competitor’s careful attention to issues of validity.
Both liability and injunction can be completely avoided by a
showing that the claimed invention was not in the first instance “worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent.”71 Validity issues may be raised as a complete defense
to an infringement suit or may support their own declaratory
judgment action.72 In either case, the patentee’s competitors
serve an important policing function in the patent system by
searching out and bringing to bear the best information they
can find about a patent’s validity.73 Validity-destroying information—such as prior art—may be in the possession of the
70. See generally Grady & Alexander, supra note 66 (discussing a patent’s
role in limiting post-invention rent-seeking, and therefore rent-dissipating,
behavior).
71. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 1292.
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
73. Competitors of the patentee often are well informed about the field of
endeavor and have different information than the patentee. Patent examination is an ex parte proceeding and only the prior art known by the applicant
and the examiner are considered when assessing patentability. Although issued patents are presumed valid, information not considered by the Patent
Office is often instrumental in a court order of invalidity. The federal courts,
not the Patent Office, are the final arbiter of validity. E.g., Quad Envtl. Techs.
Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 875-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The
courts are the final arbiter of patent validity and, although courts may take
cognizance of, and benefit from, the proceedings before the patent examiner,
the question is ultimately for the courts to decide, without deference to the rulings of the patent examiner.”).
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competitor, or it may be found only after scouring public and
private sources around the world.
Shavell and van Ypersele maintain that the government
may have better information concerning the ultimate market
demand for a product after sales have occurred than a patentee
would have before deciding to invent.74 The existence of market demand, however, does not establish that the invention itself would have been patentable, and no market participant
would have an adequate incentive to provide the government
with information relating to patentability.75 In addition, the
government’s ability to uncover such information itself may be
substantially less than that of a competitor under the current
system, especially where the competitor possesses the information.76
It is possible that Shavell and van Ypersele are not concerned with validity issues. For example, their system of rewards may be indifferent between new technologies and revived ones. Rewards, however, would be very difficult to dole
out in such a system. Every market having large demand
would generate droves of reward claimants each asserting to
have made some contribution. Thus, reward systems face the
serious practical hurdle of having to develop an effective
74. SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 22.
75. Individual taxpayers would face an enormous collective action problem, each one facing only a minute pro-rata benefit while bearing the entire
search cost. Although those who would be rival claimants to inventor status
in a patent system would present themselves as rival claimants to the cash
reward, contests among rival claimants to a patent (called interference proceedings) are relatively rare compared with challenges to validity based on
lack of novelty, obviousness, or inadequate disclosure. See, e.g., 1987 Committee Report, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 64 (noting that
the interference practice in the United States in 1987 typically involved less
than 0.25% of all patent applications, or about three hundred of the approximately 130,000 applications filed each year).
76. Additional evidence supporting this point can be found in the example
of the present Patent and Trademark Office, which issues numerous patents
that are later found invalid by a federal court based on prior art not uncovered
during examination. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. This occurs
even though the Patent Office is funded through user fees and is not resource
constrained, generating a budget surplus of over $70 million per year. See
PTO Fees Will Remain With Agency, Under FY 2000 Budget Plan, Dickinson
Says, 57 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 282, 282 (1999) (discussing Patent
Office funding and the budget surplus). Implicit in the commercialization
view of the patent system offered in this Article is the understanding that the
Patent Office is not malfunctioning when it issues such patents. Indeed, according to this view, the system is not operating grossly out of tune with its
design.
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method for deciding how to allocate the rewards among all such
possible claimants.77
In contradistinction, the patent system does not face such a
hurdle. The same core legal rules that drive the patent system
simultaneously provide the system with its own method for deciding which inventive activities are eligible to receive the
benefit of a patent. The tests of novelty, nonobviousness, and
adequacy of disclosure serve this decisional function for the
patent system, and they discipline the system through litigation and its threat.78
A system of patent buy-outs offered by Kremer may provide a solution to the validity problem faced by the cash reward
model.79 Under Kremer’s proposal, the government would use
an auction to estimate the private value of patents.80 The government would buy out most patents put to auction, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their true evaluations, a few
patents would be sold to bidders.81 Because bidders would not
77. The problems with allocating rewards or any other kind of kudos for
good results are legion. Consider the general problem of allocating fame:
What exactly constitutes an honest fame, what a dishonest fame?
What are the rules, criteria, precepts, principles, if there be any, by
which we decide whom to accord how much glory for what achievement, and by which we decide who has laid claim to fame that isn’t
his? Are there such rules, and do they span the full range of moral,
scientific, and artistic accomplishments for which glory is bestowed?
LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 (1996). Katz uses societal rules for blame embodied
in the criminal law to attempt to derive societal rules for fame. See id. at 201
(describing the symmetrical relationship between societal rules of praise and
blame). Concerning the distinction between acts and omissions, one might ask
what level of contribution is required on the part of a supervising faculty
member for co-authorship or co-inventorship. Is active advice required, or is
passive permission and non-interference sufficient where others would have
refused to allow or continue a project? Cf. id. at 201-03 (discussing the significance of affirmative acts, omissions, and motive in establishing the principles
of praise). Also consider how the rules of praise should evaluate the problems
presented by cases of mere thought, transferred intent, or unreasonable hopes,
any of which might nonetheless correlate with inventive success. Cf. id. To
what extent should originality, effort, genius, or utility drive our decisions to
allocate rewards? Cf. id. at 203-04 (describing the tension between originality
and utilitarianum as the basis of rewards for scientific progress).
78. Cf. infra text accompanying note 195 (arguing that the desire to obtain a broad-reaching patent is moderated by the vulnerability of such a patent on various validity grounds in litigation).
79. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. (explaining that the government would randomly select a few patents to be sold to the highest bidder).
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know which patents would be purchased, they would have incentives to value them all honestly.82 Like cash rewards, patent buy-outs would operate to eliminate the patentee’s potential power over price and its commensurate dead-weight loss.83
The informational advantage of Kremer’s proposal over a
system of cash rewards comes from the fact that the bidders in
Kremer’s system are potential patent owners. Before bidding,
such potential owners will be sure not only to acquire information about the market demand for the invention claimed in the
patents but also about patent validity. Indeed, the incentives
for such bidders to acquire information about validity will be
similar to the incentives facing potential infringers under a
patent system.84 Thus, the valuation set by Kremer’s system
will be better or more cheaply informed about issues of validity
than the cash reward system offered by Shavell and van
Ypersele.
Nevertheless, both proposed systems—rewards and buyouts—present the same timing paradox discussed earlier.85 To
the extent the reward or buy-out is implemented soon after the
invention is made, the systems fail to provide incentives for full
commercialization, thereby preventing nascent inventions from
reaching consumers.86 To the extent the reward or buy-out is
implemented long after the invention is made, and presumably
before the expiration of patent term,87 then incentives for some
level of commercialization are present but both systems merely
amount to a decrease in patent term with respect to their impact on subsequent commercialization.
It is possible that a decrease in patent term may not upset
the patent system. To be sure, any particular systemic patent
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1-2.
84. Such bidders will want to acquire information about the patent’s validity because the bidder may become the owner of the patent and have to rely
on asserting the patent to recoup the price paid at the consummated sale of
the patent. A purchased patent that was ultimately adjudicated invalid by a
court would be a loss to the bidder who purchased that patent. See supra text
accompanying note 73.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
86. See id.
87. The possibility of implementing the reward or buy-out so long after
the invention is made that it is also after the expiration of patent term suggests use of the reward or buy-out as a mere adjunct to, not replacement for,
the current patent system. Although this use must be considered in any balanced policy of industrial development, it is not the focus of the reward and
buy-out systems offered by critics of the patent system.
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term represents an arbitrary compromise. Any term will satisfy a commercialization theory of the patent system if it remains sufficiently long and is fixed, publicly noticed, and otherwise inexpensive to administer. Kremer points out one way
to compensate for a shortened term, which would be to add a
multiplier of greater than one to the price reached at auction.88
Indeed, both Kremer and Shavell and van Ypersele argue that
inventors do not reap the full social benefit of their inventions
under a simple buy-out system (and to a lesser extent under
the current patent system).89 The multiplier of Kremer’s system includes a fixed markup to roughly cover the difference between the social and private values of inventions.90 Therefore,
Kremer’s proposal can be seen as an addition to the patent system characterized by shorter term and enhanced financial reward that may not be inconsistent with the commercialization
theory.91 It could not work, however, without the patent sys88. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 16-18; see also SHAVELL & VAN
YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1. Kremer makes this multiplier suggestion in an
effort to help ensure that the level of incentive provided more closely approximates the social value of the invention. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 16-18;
see also SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1. Although his suggestion is motivated by concerns that the incentives provided to a patentee under
the patent system are too low because of dead-weight loss, the suggestion may
also be responsive to a decrease in incentives caused by shorter term. See id.
Regardless of motivation, the enhanced price would serve to add the appropriate incentive to inventors without distorting the auction process because it
would be paid by the government in the buy-out cases but not by bidders in
the consummated sales cases.
89. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 16-18; see also SHAVELL & VAN
YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1; id. at 5-6 (describing the inadequate incentive
facing investors because even monopoly profits are likely to be less than the
total social surplus generated by the invention).
90. An important contribution of Kremer’s model is the conclusion that
inventors do not reap the full social benefit of their inventions under either a
simple buy-out system or the current patent system. See supra text accompanying note 28. It is for this reason that Kremer includes in his buy-out system
a fixed markup to roughly cover this difference between the social and private
values of inventions. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5. Under Kremer’s
proposal, the market value of the patents would be determined through auctionhe proposes a sealed-bid second-price auction to prevent collusion to increase priceand then the government would offer to buy patents at this private value times some constant markup, which would reflect the typical ratio
of social to private value. See id. at 16-18.
91. Lichtman offers an alternative addition to the system in which the
government offers a cash subsidy to any consumer who values a patented good
above marginal cost but is unwilling or unable to pay to such a price. Douglas
Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124-25
(1997). This proposal, however, faces the distortion and implementation con-
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tem operating in the first few years of patent term for those
patents bought out by the government and operating full term
for those patents for which the auction is consummated.
Thus, the commercialization view of the patent system reveals how the patent system is superior to the proposed reward
and buy-out systems in both promoting invention commercialization and in deciding which inventive activities are eligible to
receive some government-conferred benefit.
Nevertheless,
sponsors of the proposed alternatives to the patent system have
responded to concerns about several important perceived shortcomings of the system that must be addressed. As discussed in
the sections that follow, the commercialization view of the patent system also reveals how the current system obviates the
concerns that motivated critics of the system in a way that is
squarely consistent with core theories of property rights.
II. PATENTS FOR COMMERCIALIZATION WITHOUT
UNDERUSE
The power to restrict use that drives the incentives for
commercialization discussed in the previous section also gives
rise to the central concern that motivated critics of the system:
too little use may result. More particularly, this concern takes
three forms. First, rights of exclusion in inventions will clog
social ordering and bargaining around inventions. Second, the
power over price conferred by a right to exclude may result in
the creation of an overall dead-weight loss for society. Third,
enforcement of the right to exclude might be better administered through a liability rule, rather than a property rule. The
following sections address each of these concerns in turn.
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS TO AVOID UNDERUSE
The creation of a property right to exclude others from partaking in the benefits of commercialization efforts is consistent
with the basic thesis of Demsetz that property rights emerge
when it becomes economically efficient to internalize benefits
and costs.92 His most cited example is the emergence of property rights in land among Labradorian Indians as a response to
overhunting.93 As Demsetz explains, after the creation of propcerns generally raised against subsidies.
92. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 354 (1967).
93. See id. at 351-53 (asserting that a rise in demand for fur relative to
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erty rights, “an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others,
can generally count on realizing the rewards associated with
husbanding the game and increasing the fertility of his land.”94
While most often this example is cited as a problem of
overuse, the tragedy of the Demsetz example can also be seen
as one of underuse, or underproduction. The inability to capture a sufficient benefit from an asset may dissuade anyone
from incurring costs necessary to make use of that asset. To
the extent the asset is an input to the downstream production
of something else, then the problem can be characterized as one
of underproduction. In the case of inventions, the problem can
be viewed as both underuse of the invention and the resulting
underproduction of commercial embodiments.95
The notion that underuse may arise from a commons has
been debated. Posner and Michelman, for example, have argued about whether property rights in crops increase agricultural production.96 But while recognizing that the historical record does not strictly provide a resolution to the question,
Ellickson has pointed out that “no group in human history has
ever treated cultivated crops as an open-access resource that
any passerby could harvest.”97
Heller provides another example that he calls “Poach
Pond.”98 According to this example, underfishing of a pond may
occur if the rule were that any community member could appropriate fish until the moment of consumption because people
supply prompted Labradorian Indians to create exclusive hunting territories).
94. Id. at 356.
95. Such underuse and underproduction may not appear at first glance to
be linked to the problem of overuse most often associated with Demsetz. However, as in his example, the underuse of some assets may cause a society to
fully deplete its supplies of other assets. See id. at 351-53. In his example, the
underuse of animal husbanding and land management resources (skills and
labor) led to near exhaustion of animal resources (food and clothing). See id.
It was the institution of a right to exclude that provided incentives for individuals to make more use of the one set of resources in order not to waste, and
indeed to replenish, the other.
96. The debate is summarized in Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1398-99 (1993) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (4th ed. 1992); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics,
and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV
25-27 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982)).
97. Ellickson, supra note 96, at 1399 (citing Martin J. Bailey, Approximate
Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J.L. & ECON. 183, 185 (1992)).
98. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons].

KIEFF.FNL

1/15/01 3:35 PM

2001] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RULES

719

might prefer to wait on shore and poach the catch of others
rather than invest in fishing themselves.99 Heller provides this
example in his important paper on a topic he calls the tragedy
of the anticommons.100 His thesis is that when too many owners hold rights of exclusion in a resource, the resource is prone
to underuse.101 Heller’s anticommons approach may suggest an
analytical problem for patents. The possibility of numerous
patents exerting a right to exclude over a single marketable
item102 certainly evokes an anticommons image, and Heller and
Eisenberg have argued that patents on gene fragments in the
biotechnology industry, called ESTs, do raise an anticommons
problem.103
Heller and Eisenberg raise an important warning about
the potential problems of anticommons in biological research.
It is not clear, however, that such an anticommons problem actually exists. Furthermore, it is not clear that a shift in patent
law would be the proper response.104 Prescribing methods for
avoiding an anticommons tragedy, Heller himself suggests (1)
that close-knit groups may develop informal norms to manage
the resource effectively or (2) that we can apply the basic teachings of Demsetz105 to determine how best to internalize benefits
and costs or to concentrate benefits and costs on owners.106 As
99. Id.
100. See generally id.
101. See id. at 624.
102. Often several patents are simultaneously in force around the same
commercial item. So-called overlapping, or mutually-blocking, patents are not
rare. Consider, for example, a patent on a widget and a subsequent patent on
a widget having rollersassuming that the addition of rollers to widgets was
new and nonobvious. If the only commercially-viable version is one having
rollers, then both patentees will be able to prevent the making, using, and selling of the commercial product. Because the patent right is only the right to
excludeand confers no affirmative right to useeven the two patentees are
unable to make widgets of the rolling variety without permission from each
other.
103. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699-700; see also Michael A.
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75
(1999) [hereinafter Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property].
104. Indeed, Heller & Eisenberg discuss reach-through technology license
agreements as a very pointed non-patent example of behavior that may lead to
anticommons. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699. They explain
that routinely voluntarily contracting into a dynamic web of contract claims on
each other’s research laboratories may create assets that no one will develop
or buy because too many stakeholders exist. Id. Like the cause, the remedy
for such a problem may lie entirely in contractual arrangements.
105. See Demsetz, supra note 92.
106. See Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 98, at 677-78.
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already discussed, it is precisely the Demsetz analysis that
suggested property rights in inventions in the first place.
Heller and Eisenberg may view the anticommons problem
as one of underproduction; they may see patents on ESTs causing underproduction of downstream innovations in genetic research.107 Yet, as previously stated, both the Demsetz problem
and the basic commercialization of inventions problem can also
be characterized as ones of underproduction. Absent the right
to exclude, too few commercial embodiments will be produced.
Alternatively, Heller and Eisenberg may view the problem
as patents on inputs unduly taxing and retarding subsequent
development or production of outputs:
The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex obstacles
that arise when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs to
create a single useful product. Each upstream patent allows its
owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product development,
adding to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical innovation.108

It cannot be, however, that patents on inputs generally prevent
the production of outputs. Entire industries have come and
gone using scores of patented inputs. Every car is made using
countless patented parts, fasteners, processes, and subsystems.
Even the biological scientist manages to use a variety of patented machines, reagents, and equipment in the ordinary
course of research. It does not appear that Heller and
Eisenberg would argue that producers of biological innovations
should not have to pay the licensing fee for ordinary inputs, including, for example, the intermittent windshield wiper subsystems on the car they drive to the laboratory in the morning.
Heller and Eisenberg may view the problem as one of
downstream research occurring before the patentee of some
particular input has managed to figure out a way to turn the
more basic invention into a commercial form. Even with adequate incentives, the commercialization of a nascent invention
may take time. In this sense, the problem facing such commercialization might be viewed as too much demand too soon. Or
more precisely, it might be viewed as an insufficient capacity
for product development, marketing, packaging, or distribution.
However, if the problem is one of insufficient resources, the so107. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699-700. A downstream innovation is taken to be one that occurs with the benefit of an earlier innovation.
108. Id. at 699.
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lution would simply be to facilitate the investment of additional
resources in the commercialization process. We typically associate investment with the recognition and enforcement of property rights, rather than their abolition.109 Furthermore, we
typically look to clear and enforceable boundaries in property
rights to provide incentives for investment while at the same
time giving clearance to non-infringing activities.110
It is also possible that Heller and Eisenberg are not simply
concerned with the need for multiple patented inputs to make a
single output, but rather are concerned that multiple patent
rights might overlap to cover different aspects of a single output. Yet, as with the multiple input problem, this problem has
not been so grave as to prevent a host of industries from operating successfully. Numerous patents simultaneously cover
countless products sold in ordinary markets. One difference
that may exist between the bundling of intangible licenses to
make a product and the bundling of tangible licensed inputs to
make a product is that there may be a more developed market
for tangible licensed inputs.
Whereas the bundling of licenses may be more difficult,
however, it is not clear that the law today would present such a
problem for the facts Heller and Eisenberg present. Heller and
Eisenberg raise the problem of patents on multiple ESTs potentially blocking the use of a larger DNA sequence of which they
can be a part.111 At least as the law currently stands, there is
little risk a patent on a small gene fragment would support a
judgment of infringement against a larger DNA sequence, such
as a substantial portion of an entire gene.
It is important to properly frame the issues facing EST
patents. Curiously, the criticism of patents on ESTs is often
phrased as lack of “utility.”112 Yet, there can be no outputrestraining effects of a patent on something useless. Consider
109. See, e.g., generally Richard Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral:
The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997).
110. See generally id.
111. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699. ESTs are only small
fragments of full-length genes. They are usually not useful in making the
product that is encoded by the gene and instead are often used as tags, or
markers, to identify whether a particular gene is present. Id. Typically, the
full-length gene, or a substantial portion of it, is needed to make the product
encoded by that gene. For most pieces of DNA, their biological significance is
due mostly to the product they encode.
112. See Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, supra note 103, at
1174-75.
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the awkwardness facing a defendant in an infringement action
who argues that despite practicing the claimed invention,
which presumably gave rise to the suit, the patent is invalid
because the invention lacks utility.113
The proper argument for the defendant is that the larger
piece of DNA does not infringe the EST claim. If the patentee
attempts to argue that the claim to the smaller fragment does
cover the fragment within the environment of the larger DNA,
then the defendant’s proper argument is that the claim is invalid over the prior art or for lack of adequate disclosure. For a
patent to be valid, the claimed subject matter must be new,
nonobvious, and the patent application must disclose the metes
and bounds of the claimed subject matter with physical and
chemical detail as well as how to make and use it.114 ESTs exist in nature in the company of the other DNA of the genome.
Thus, to overcome this prior art, a typical EST claim must be
limited to a version of the EST in some specific environment
other than its natural one, such as isolated from all other DNA
or inserted into an artificially engineered piece of DNA. Also,
to satisfy the disclosure requirements, the details of the degree
of isolation or of the engineered piece of DNA must also be provided. To put it another way, a patent claim directed to a gene
fragment like an EST cannot be construed to cover larger DNA
sequences like a substantial portion of an entire gene without
being held invalid over the prior art or invalid for inadequate
disclosure.115 More simply, a patent on an EST will not preclude the use of an entire gene.

113. As I have argued in other work, it is not even clear that the patent
system needs a separate utility requirement. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2,
at 744-45. There is no harm, and may be some benefit, to granting a patent on
a useless invention. A patent on a purportedly useless invention that has
many infringers must cover an invention that really is quite useful after all. If
the invention really is useless, then no one will want to practice it. As a result, a useless patent does not prevent anyone from doing what he or she
would like to doa useless patent will never be infringed. A useless patent
can even have benefits. If the lack of utility is absolute, then the patent
teaches others what not to do. If the lack of utility is really just a lack of some
practical application, then the patent has still contributed to the public storehouse of basic knowledge. Id. Furthermore, the commercialization view
shows why the patent will actually help by providing incentives for coordinated efforts to develop such practical applications.
114. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
115. See S. Leslie Misrock & Stephen S. Rabinowitz, The Inventor’s Gamble: Written Description and Prophetic Claiming of Biotechnology Inventions,
in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 331.
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Nevertheless, a patent on an EST should allow the patentee to exclude use of that particular EST in isolation or in an
engineered construct. This raises an important concern elucidated in an earlier work by Eisenberg in which she suggests
that in science, organized skepticism, or the need to scrutinize
scientific claims, requires that we permit under patent law the
use of a patented invention simply to verify scientific claims by
the patentee.116 To the extent that the anticommons tragedy
does operate, its impact would be particularly pernicious where
the need to use is motivated by the mere need for scientific
verification. Heller’s first proposed solution to the potential
tragedy may provide complete relief in this case. Heller suggests that close-knit groups may develop informal norms to
manage an anticommons resource effectively.117 Federal granting organizations or state licensing boards could require researchers in the basic sciences to grant limited nonexclusive in
personam licenses in all inventions to all colleagues, but limited to use in verification only.118 Alternatively, collectiverights groups could be organized, like the artists-rights groups
ASCAP and BMI in the copyright context, in order to facilitate
broad based licenses for a variety of uses across the research
sector, thereby assuaging any remaining anticommons concerns.119
116. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1078 (1989).
117. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 98, at 677-78.
118. See Joseph M. Reisman, Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors: Reconciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 355,
397-98 (1995). In the context of such a verification use, the defendant might
even mount an implied license or estoppel defense based on the industry custom and affirmative statements by the patentee asserting scientific truth. Alternatively, the patentee may rationally elect to encourage multiple verifiersand even challengersto endeavor to repeat or use his patented work in
order to gain additional scientific kudos in the form of citations. JEROME R.
RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 245 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting that scientists throughout time have treated reports of a scientist’s
work, such as through journal publication, and citation thereto, as valuable
currencies in the market for scientific kudos, and reviewing countless ingenious methods scientists have developed for staking out, defending, and even
pirating these assets). Such reliance on citation analysis as a measure of kudos is not limited to science and indeed is a topic of great interest to communities in other disciplines, such as law. See, e.g., Symposium, Trends in Legal
Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742, 746 (1996).
119. See Reisman, supra note 118, at 400-01. The suggestion of licenses
here may raise some concerns about the ability of academic science to fund
such licenses. Although funding is an important issue, it is distinct from the
issue of whether patents should be available in science. Moreover, the exis-
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Even if relief from anticommons concerns were not complete in the field of biological sciences, the need for commercialization incentives in this industry is uncommonly strong.
Costs of commercialization in the biotechnology industry are
exceptionally high—it is estimated to take over ten years and
several hundred million dollars to bring a single drug to market.120 Risks of commercialization in the biotechnology industry are also exceptionally high—only a minute fraction of all
compounds that reach clinical trials successfully complete trials
and make it all of the way to market.121 Moreover, these costs
tence of commercial markets for countless scientific instruments, reagents,
and other inputs that are covered by patents demonstrates that the patents
are not incompatible with basic science.
120. Exact numbers vary among estimates. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S,
INDUSTRY SURVEYS: BIOTECHNOLOGY 16-17 (Aug. 28, 1997) (“[M]ost new
products cost between $200 million and $350 million to fully develop.”); Joseph
A. DiMasi, Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALTH
ECON. 107, 125-26 (1991) (estimating an average of twelve years and $231 million cost for drug research and development); Veronica Henry, Problems with
Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States: Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 617 (1993) (reporting that it costs “approximately $231
million and takes approximately ten to twelve years to develop a new drug in
the United States”); J. Casey McGlynn & Grant Heidrich, Biotech Financing
Remains a Tough Row to Hoe, 13 BIO/TECH. 638, 639 (1995) (estimating biotechnology research and development at over $200 million per product);
George Anders, Vital Statistic: Disputed Cost of Creating a Drug, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 9, 1993, at B1, B5 (citing an Office of Technology Assessment report that
the cost of bringing a new drug to market is $194 million after accounting for
tax deductions for research and development); Geoffrey Carr, A Survey of the
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Alchemists, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 4 of
insert (reporting estimate of $300 million to develop a new drug); Shawn
Tully, You’ll Never Guess Who Really Makes . . ., FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1994, at
124, 128 (“Bringing a drug to market takes about twelve years.”); Interview
with Alan Walton, BIOVENTURE VIEW, Jan. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL
9219211 (“On average, it takes a new drug 6.1 years in discovery, 6.9 years in
clinical development, and 2.3 years waiting for FDA review before approval.”).
Furthermore, few of the drugs that actually reach the market ever recover the
costs of research and development. H.G. Grabowski & J.M. Vernon, A New
Look at the Return and Risks to Pharmaceutical R&D, 36 MANAGEMENT SCI.
804, 804-821 (1990) (reporting that for the period of 1980-1984, only three out
of ten drugs that are brought to market cover development costs after taxes
and that 20% of the products with the highest revenues generated 70% of the
profits); F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 106 (1993) (estimating that
55% of industry profits came from the top ten drugs).
121. Richard G. Halliday et al., R&D Philosophy and Management in the
World’s Leading Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MED. 139,
139-54 (1992) (reporting that only one out of five thousand compounds synthesized during clinical trials eventually reached the market); Henry, supra note
120, at 617 (“For every 10,000 drug candidates created in the lab only 1000
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and risks are unique to the first mover because marginal cost
in this industry is also uncommonly low when compared to initial commercialization costs.122 According to the commercialization view offered in this Article, it is precisely this combination of high initial commercialization costs and risks facing the
first mover and low marginal costs facing a second mover that
makes the biotechnology industry a particularly strong candidate for patent protection. In fact, since the changes in applicable patent law beginning around 1980 that are the focus of
patent critics, such as the availability of patent protection for
living organisms and gene fragments,123 the U.S. biotechnology
community has enjoyed particularly rapid and large advances
in technology and overall prosperity,124 especially compared
with the biotechnology communities of other countries that did
compounds will be tested in animals to reveal their pharmacological and toxicological characteristics. Of those 1000 compounds, only one will end up on
the pharmacist’s shelf. Only one in five new compounds tested in humans is
likely to reach the market.” (citing Williams & Copelan, New Drugs for 1993,
THE CONSULTANT PHARMACIST, Mar. 1993, at 208)); Brian H. Vickery, Costs of
Research and Patent Considerations, 8 J. ANDROLOGY S-27, S-27 (1987) (calculating that the “overall probability of a . . . newly synthesized compound reaching the marketplace reaches the vanishingly small figure of less than 1:12,000
(0.008%)”).
122. See, e.g., William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J.
LEG. MED. 263, 264 (1990) (describing biological inventions as particularly
susceptible to piracy because they exhibit high costs to develop but relatively
low costs to replicate). Indeed, the relatively low marginal cost in the field of
biotechnology is recognized generally, including by the proponents of alternatives to the patent system who target this feature as a reason to avoid patents.
See supra notes 10-11. The proponents of alternatives to the patent system
rely on this fact of low marginal cost as a reason to avoid property rights because they assume the low marginal cost will be associated with monopoly effects. Yet, as discussed infra in Part II.B, the existence of substitutes will
likely prevent patents from having monopoly characteristics, and the ability to
price discriminate will likely prevent any patents that do exhibit monopoly
characteristics from causing a restriction in output and the commensurate
dead-weight loss. Moreover, as discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
218-19, this low marginal cost in the face of large average cost is exactly what
makes a compelling need for the commercialization incentives that patents
provide.
123. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699 (criticizing the use
of patents on living organisms and gene fragments since the 1980 landmark
Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980),
which held that living organisms are not per se unpatentable).
124. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-33 (1991) (reviewing changes in the
“new biotechnology,” which refers to the industrial use of recombinant DNA,
cell fusion, and bioprocessing techniques that did not come into regular use
until around 1980 or thereafter).
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not readily adopt such changes in applicable patent law as
quickly as the United States, if at all.125
Furthermore, the large risks of commercialization in the
biotechnology industry also provide a particularly strong incentive for patentees in this industry to license broadly as a
method for reducing risk. Licensing to hedge risk makes sense
because once a firm becomes competent in pursuing one avenue
of development, the firm may have difficulty keeping track of
other potential avenues.126 Indeed, the use of joint ventures
and other licensing strategies to reduce commercialization risk
in the biotechnology industry is well recognized.127
Therefore, rather than becoming clogged, social ordering
and bargaining around inventions will operate better if inventions are subject to the property right of a patent. Without the
property right acting to concentrate benefits and costs on owners, too few individuals will invest in making use of inventions
to bring them to commercial fruition. The popular foil raised
against property rights in inventions is that they will unduly
tax or retard use in subsequent scientific endeavors. As explored above, however, the concerns raised by such a foil are illusory. The existence of commercial markets for countless scientific inputs that are covered by patents demonstrates that
the patent right to exclude does not necessarily prevent scientists from getting access to and using inputs for scientific research. In addition, at least for the example of patents on
ESTs, patent law’s validity rules operate to prevent patents on
many such basic inventions from reaching much of the downstream research as well as most commercial products. Furthermore, the relatively small size of the academic science
community suggests that informal norms may evolve to man125. See generally Iain Cockburn et al., Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, in U.S. INDUSTRY IN 2000: STUDIES IN COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE 363,
389-92 (David C. Mowery ed., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/open
book/0309061792/html/363.html (reviewing and explaining reasons for the
relative performance of the United States biotechnology industry).
126. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 873 (1990) (discussing empirical explorations and citing R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 389 (1982)); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY II: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 618-19 (1962)
(noting the importance of multiple avenues of research stemming from a single
item of information where the particular utility of that information is uncertain).
127. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 120, at 5 of insert.

KIEFF.FNL

1/15/01 3:35 PM

2001] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RULES

727

age any anticommons concerns that do exist. Even if relief
from anticommons concerns were not complete, however, the
need for commercialization incentives in this industry is uncommonly strong in the field of biological sciences.
Although the right to exclude does not appear to raise undue concerns specific to academic science, a more general concern levied against patents relates to the power over price that
may be conferred by such a right to exclude. Power over price
is generally considered to create a dead-weight loss for society.128 As described in more detail in the following section, the
ability for the patentee to engage in price discrimination may
avoid such dead-weight loss.
B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION TO AVOID DEAD-WEIGHT LOSS
The creation of a property right in inventions is also consistent with another basic work by Demsetz in which he demonstrated that (1) private producers can produce public goods
efficiently given the ability to exclude nonpurchasers and (2)
price discrimination is consistent with competitive equilibrium
for such public goods.129 Inventions and their commercialization express prototypical attributes of public goods.
Public goods have two characteristics: they are nonrival
and nonexclusive. A good is nonrival if consumption by one
person does not leave any less of the good to be consumed by
others.130 In microeconomic terms, a good is nonrival if for any
given level of production, the marginal cost of providing it to an
additional consumer is zero. A good is nonexclusive if people
cannot be excluded from consuming it. In addition to information, national defense, television signals, and police protection
are generally considered to be further examples of public goods.
The two distinctive features of public goods—nonrival and nonexclusive—suggest that public goods will tend to be underproduced or not produced at all.
Inventions and their commercialization are nonrival in
that their use by one person does not leave any less to be used
128. Dead-weight loss represents a net decrease in societal wealth. For a
basic explanation of dead-weight loss, see supra note 22.
129. Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1970).
130. Recall Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Isaac McPherson, wherein Jefferson wrote that “[h]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 1291.
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by another. This nonrival nature of inventions is tied very
closely to one of the central concerns expressed by critics of the
patent system. After invention, the marginal cost of production
for each subsequent use of the invention is very low, even approximating zero in most cases. Yet the patentee must charge
at least average cost—which includes fixed costs of inventing
and commercializing—in order to break even. The right to exclude gives the patentee potential power over price, permitting
him to charge above marginal cost and thereby potentially creating dead-weight loss.131 It is the elimination of this deadweight loss that motivates the criticisms of the patent system
discussed earlier.132
Absent patent protection, inventions and their commercialization are also nonexclusive. To be sure, self-help mechanisms may operate to give some level of exclusivity to some inventions. Each of these self-help mechanisms has limitations.
For example, secrecy is not feasible for some inventions, such
as those easily reverse-engineered. In addition, breach of secrecy can benefit the entire world of competitors, including
those not complicit in the breach and therefore whose use
would not be actionable. Similarly, limiting contract provisions
may operate to give some cause of action against contracting
parties but will only reach those with privity of contract.
Moreover, neither secrecy nor contract limitations will operate
against independent creation.
The patent system operates by creating a legal form of exclusivity. Importantly, as Demsetz makes clear, the deadweight loss ordinarily associated with exclusivity can be
avoided by price discrimination.133 One method of price discrimination suggested by Demsetz is the tying of a public good
with a private good that is excludable.134 Indeed, Demsetz
shows that private producers of public goods may simply create
this type of linking themselves as a method for funding the
131. The creation of dead-weight loss from pricing above marginal costs can
best be seen in the context of monopoly pricing. For a basic explanation of
dead-weight loss, see supra note 22. A more thorough, but easily readable description can be found in PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 56, at 333-52.
The reader with a taste for higher math and multivariate calculus may prefer
the teachings in BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS
WITH CALCULUS 375-85 (1988), or HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
79-95 (1984).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 27-46.
133. See Demsetz, supra note 129, at 310-12.
134. Id. at 306.
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public good’s production.135 For example, Demsetz explains two
types of tie-ins for the provision of radio and television broadcasting: a tie to advertisers who want viewer attention and will
pay for commercial air time or a tie to set manufacturers who
would want to support popular shows to foster demand for
sets.136 But such ties are not always possible under given market and technological conditions absent the legal right to exclude afforded by a patent.
It may seem that a governmentally created patent right
would be antithetical to Demsetz in view of his conclusion that
because such tie-ins may be available mechanisms by which the
private sector can produce public goods, it is imprudent to look
first to government for public good production.137 He does recognize, however, that such a tie-in mechanism may not lend itself to the efficient production of some public goods. Indeed,
even his suggested tie-in scheme may face a free rider problem
between the two sources of funding. Set manufacturers may
underrepresent their interest in having good shows knowing
that the advertisers will have a strong interest in keeping
something on the air that holds the attention of the audience.
Set producers may not even care whether audiences prefer programs, informative advertisements, or amusing advertisements, as long as they want to buy sets.
The patent system offers Demsetz a minimal form of government intervention for facilitating tie-ins, at least less than
would be required for government production and commercialization of inventions, which were the target of his criticism.138
Under the patent system, the potential for tie-ins comes from
the patentee’s right to exclude for direct infringement as well
as contributory and induced infringement. The creation of such
a legal ability to tie-in would operate to enable tie-ins where
technological and economic factors alone might make ties difficult, and would generally broaden the range of tie-ins possible.
Thus, a patent system that facilitated appropriate tie-ins would
theoretically operate to allow private commercialization of inventions without the creation of dead-weight loss.
Although perfect price discrimination is impossible, it may
also not be necessary because the extent of a patentee’s power

135.
136.
137.
138.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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over price may be otherwise limited. More specifically, patents
may not give a great deal of monopoly or even market power.
Patents often do not define markets.139 Markets order themselves around consumer demand—producers sell what consumers will buy. In general, consumers buy to satisfy their needs
or desires. In the context of a particular consumer problem,
like mouse infestation, for example, consumers need or want
solutions, and producers sell these solutions, perhaps in the
form of mouse traps or cats. A patentee can exclude others
from making, using, selling, or offering for sale a particular invention. In a market for solutions, a patentee can prevent others from selling a certain solution, though not all solutions, to a
given problem. For example, people will buy better mousetraps
only if they cost less than cats, accounting for all costs and
benefits such as cat food and companionship.
As Kitch has pointed out, patented inventions also face the
competitive pressures of time.140 Early in life, the patented invention faces competition from the very technologies it has rendered obsolete. For example, older technologies may be somewhat less effective but still be cheaper, in price or total cost of
use. Similarly, changes in related industries can make the
formerly obsolete technologically or economically superior to
139. For precisely this reason, Justice Clark writing for the Supreme Court
noted,
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize . . . it would
then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the . . . patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved.
Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure [the
patentee’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition. It may be that the
[patented] device . . . does not comprise a relevant market. There
may be effective substitutes for the device which do not infringe the
patent.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 17778 (1965). Dam has similarly noted,
Indeed, it became conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly.
Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another
from “manufacture, use, and sale” may give no significant market
power, even when the patent covers a product that is sold in the market. Indeed, without the benefit of empirical research, it is entirely
plausible to conclude that in the great bulk of instances no significant
market power is granted. We must bear in mind that leading companies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and yet many
such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any
market.
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 249-50 (1994) (citations omitted).
140. See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES.
L. & ECON. 31, 31 (1986).
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the new technology. Later in life, the patented invention may
face competition from even newer inventions. Most importantly, patent term is limited to about seventeen years on average,141 and upon expiration, the patentee will face competition
over the invention itself.
To be sure, under the right circumstances, the case of a
patented drug may provide an example of a market having a
sufficient barrier to entry to be a monopoly. The patent term
and the state of the evolving art would have to be such that
there exists a certain class of patients having such an acute illness that they are unable to wait for the development of alternative noninfringing solutions or for patent expiration. In this
case, the limited market at this time and for these patients is a
monopoly. Price discrimination may be a particularly important tool for eliminating dead-weight loss in such markets.142
Moreover, as Demsetz recognized, any remaining dead-weight
loss in the static analysis may still be a worthwhile sacrifice in
return for the gains from enhanced output of invention commercialization in the dynamic analysis.143
The dead-weight loss potentially caused by a patent right
to exclude may loom ominously before commentators on the
patent system, but its menace is merely phantasmal. Concerns
about dead-weight loss do not provide a proper motivation for
seeking alternatives to the system. Most patents fail to give
any significant market power, especially not monopoly power.
Even if a perfect monopoly were associated with a patented
141. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
142. The ability to charge each patient exactly her reserve price, above
which she would not pay, would provide the seller with a strong financial incentive to find and sell to each patient. If price discrimination is available, the
seller has a strong financial motivation to increase output to the same levels
as under a competitive market. To be sure, such price discrimination requires
the ability to prevent arbitrage among patients, such as through enforceable
contract terms against resale. In addition, consumer subsidies may provide
another solution. See Lichtman, supra note 91, at 126-30.
143. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,
12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (critiquing the so-called nirvana approach in favor
of a comparative institution approach). Demsetz notes that Arrow’s indivisibility problem may be handled best by a private property system that reduces
the cost of contracting and raises the cost of free loading while simultaneously
providing incentives for investment. See id. at 14 (critiquing Arrow, supra
note 126, at 609-25). Even critics of the use of price discrimination when unconnected to intellectual property rights recognize its important beneficial impact when used in conjunction with intellectual property rights. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1998).
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product, the patent system gives the patentee a strong financial
incentive to avoid the dead-weight loss typically associated
with monopolies. The ability to price discriminate gives the
patentee incentive to elect not to restrict output by allowing the
patentee to profit for each additional unit of output sold, up to
the same total level of output that would be sold in a competitive market.
C. PROPERTY RULES TO AVOID UNDERUSE
Simply deciding that patents should be property rights
does not necessarily settle the question of whether they should
be enforced as property rules rather than liability rules.144 An
entitlement enjoys the protection of a property rule if the law
condones its surrender only through voluntary exchange.145
The holder of such an entitlement is allowed to enjoin infringement.146 An entitlement has the lesser protection of a liability rule if it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay
some court-determined compensation.147 The holder of such an
entitlement is only entitled to damages caused by infringement.148
A recent article by Ayres and Klemperer essentially advocates a liability rule for patents by suggesting that, like a system of compulsory licenses, a patent litigation system characterized by uncertainty and delay but increased patent term
may provide adequate incentives for patentees while reducing
the distortionary effects of an absolute right to exclude.149 Although the argument presented by Ayres and Klemperer is insightful, there are several reasons that only property rules are
appropriate for patents.
Under the commercialization view of patents, there are a
number of parties who want to and must be able to contract
over patent rights. For example, complete transferability is
important to ensure that commercialization is conducted by the
lowest cost provider. Similarly, varying degrees of licensing
144. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972).
145. See id. at 1105.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1105-06.
148. See id.
149. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 992 (criticizing the crispness
of the present patent system).
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must occur to facilitate price discrimination. But the costs of
such transactions increase with uncertainty in enforcement.
As recognized by Haddock, McChesney, and Speigel, the potential infringements induced by a liability rule will discourage investments in the invention ex ante.150 Especially in the case of
a large number of potential traders for the asset, the imposition
of a liability rule may create a prisoner’s dilemma in which
each player’s dominant strategy is to infringe in order to garner
more of the potential gains from exchange for himself.151
It is precisely because all of these players will individually
want to come together and bargain that the costs of evaluating
the commercialization of the invention will be less than those
facing an inexperienced decision maker like a court. As recognized by Merges, the fact that private parties have a comparative advantage over courts in valuing patents would trigger the
imposition of a property rule rather than a liability rule under
the Calabresi and Melamed test.152
In the context of the Ayres and Klemperer model, in which
each potential infringer is disciplined to not infringe too much
now by the threat of damages in the future, the prisoner’s dilemma may look more like the typical overproduction problem
that plagues a cartel. Each infringer may calculate the impact
of his marginal output on price without taking into account the
output from other infringers. Such uncoordinated acts of infringement may cause collective profits—those reaped by the
patentee directly and through damages awards from infringers—to fall below the total costs of creating and commercializing the invention, resulting in a destruction of wealth.153 To
put it another way, liability rules can be strategically abused.154
150. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1990).
151. See id. at 17.
152. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 144). According to Calabresi and Melamed, the inquiry requires a comparison of the relative costs of establishing the value of an initial entitlement.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 144, at 1106-10. A liability rule should
be used if a collective, public, or governmental determination would be
cheaper than a private evaluation reached by agreement of the parties. A
property rule should be used if the private evaluation would be cheaper. See
id.
153. As Ayres and Klemperer recognize, if there are fixed costs of entry or
exit, or if infringers have higher marginal cost than the patentee, then market
entry by infringers will generate extra costs for society. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 1015. In addition, although economic theory teaches
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In theory, there may be some increase in term or geographic scope of the patent sufficient to compensate for this destruction of wealth.155 As Ayres and Klemperer recognize,
however, the difficulties in implementing such a compensatory
device increase with the size of the compensation required. For
example, patents of longer term will face increasing chances of
losing some or all market power to newer competing technologies.156 In addition, though such compensating devices might
serve to ensure that the patentees, individually, continue to
face adequate incentives, they will not make up for any net decrease in social wealth.157 Acts of infringement may therefore
actually lead to destruction of value. The model presented by
Haddock, McChesney, and Spiegel shows that the imposition of
a property rule is therefore required in order to put the defendant back in the place he would have been but for the infringement, leaving him no incentive to attempt the activity in
the first place.158
Longer term may also create or exacerbate the potential
anticommons problems raised by Heller and Eisenberg.159 Increased term for each patent substantially increases the likelihood that the manufacturer of a given output will need to assemble larger numbers of tangible licensed patent inputs or
intangible patent licenses. In this sense, shorter patent term
can be viewed as facilitating contracting by clearing the governmental register of rights claimants more quickly than otherwise. In addition, as may happen with any form of property,
that in a long run equilibrium only the most efficient producers in the most
efficient number will remain in the market, during the relatively short time of
patent lifeseventeen years on averagethe costs associated with “weedouts” are likely to be significant.
154. See Haddock et al., supra note 150, at 13. Although the Ayres and
Klemperer argument does suggest that in some cases a low level of infringement may be optimal, this amount of infringement is already available under
the present patent system because of other areas of procedural and substantive law and practice. Concerning procedure, litigation costs may be high
enough to prevent the patentee from seeking court intervention against an infringer. Concerning substance, the limitations on liability that are available
to a would-be infringer through the use of the corporate form or bankruptcy
laws, for example, may encourage acts of infringements that are essentially
judgment proof.
155. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 1015, 1027-28.
156. For a discussion of the competitive pressure of time on a patentee’s
market power, see supra text accompanying note 140.
157. See supra text accompanying note 153.
158. See Haddock et al., supra note 150, at 13.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 98-111.
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increasing term will also increase the possibility of fragmentation in ownership of that property itself, which may create an
anticommons problem for both stakeholders and third parties,
each of whom may be unable to gather permission necessary to
realize full value of the asset from all stakeholders.160
Indeed, the possibility of fragmented ownership presents a
particular problem for patents. The patent right is only a right
to exclude, not a right to use. In addition, each co-owner of a
patent can decide not to exclude third parties, by giving a partial assignment or license, without accounting to any other coowner.161 As a result, an assignment by a co-owner will dissipate the entire value of the patent for all other owners. For
this reason, it is well recognized that co-ownership in patents
can create a tragedy of the commons.162 Thus, the enforcement
of the patent right with a liability rule, as compared with a
property rule, will not only frustrate the commercialization
goals of the system, but the commercialization aspect of the
system makes it particularly well suited for a property rule.
The commercialization view of the patent system therefore
helps elucidate why the power to restrict output is paradoxically essential to providing incentives for the market to generate output. Rights of exclusion facilitate efforts for the social
ordering and bargaining around inventions that are necessary
to generate output. Concerns raised by the popular foil against
property rights in inventions—that biotechnology patents will
unduly tax or retard use in subsequent scientific endeavors—
are belied by the existence of commercial markets for countless
scientific inputs that are covered by patents. They also pale in
comparison to the sharp need for patents in the biotechnology
industry. Concerns about dead-weight loss also do not provide
a proper motivation for seeking alternatives to the system.
Most patents fail to give any significant market power and the
patent system’s ability to price discriminate actually gives the
patentee strong financial incentive to elect not to restrict output, thereby avoiding the dead-weight loss typically associated
with monopolies. Indeed, not only are property rights of exclusion advantageous, they must also be enforced by a property
rule, and not a liability rule. The use of liability rules would
lead to a net increase in social cost and frustrate the very ef160. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
161. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).
162. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1228-36 (2d
ed. 1997).
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forts for ordering and bargaining around patents that are necessary to generate output of patented inventions.
Having reviewed how the commercialization view of patents helps elucidate why the system should function better
than suggested alternatives, the section that follows explores
some of the detailed operations of the system to show how functionality is achieved. The following section also reveals how
property rights and commercialization motivated the creation
of our current patent system.
III. COMMERCIALIZATION BY DESIGN
The modern patent system provides the incentive to commercialize without the creation of dead-weight loss by setting
forth crisp and enforceable rules for determining both validity
and infringement. The power of the patent derives from the
patent’s grant of a limited right to exclude. The owner of a patent can prevent anyone from making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing the patented invention for the entire term
of the patent.163 Neither innocent copying nor independent
origination of a patented invention provides a defense to patent
infringement. Although the protection afforded by patents is
very strong, it is also short in comparison to the protection
available for copyrights and trademarks. In general, patents
last for only seventeen years.164
In addition, the patentee’s ability to conduct price discrimination is based on the ability to sue or elect to license both

163. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (1994). The right to exclude is all that the
patent gives. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 42 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852)
(“The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making . . . .”). A patent confers no right to use. For a
general discussion of patents and the patent grant, see CHISUM ET AL., supra
note 2, at 2-7, and for a detailed review of the rights and limitations of the
patent grant, see id. at 894-1030.
164. All patents arising out of applications that were filed before June 8,
1995 have a patent term that spans seventeen years from the issue date of the
patent. Patents arising out of applications that were filed on or after June 8,
1995, have a patent term that begins on the date the patent issues but lasts
twenty years measured from the earliest claimed application filing date. See
Pub L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4988-89 (1994). The average term for
these more recent applications will remain seventeen years because for most
applications, there is an average of three years between filing and issuance.
However, if the application claims the benefit of a substantially earlier filing
date (to antedate certain prior art, for example), then the patent term may be
much shorter. For a brief discussion of the change from a seventeen to twenty
year patent term, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 898-900.
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direct and indirect infringers and even grant restrictive licenses. The patent laws give causes of action for both inducement of infringement and contributory infringement and expressly allow the patentee to elect to grant a restrictive or
unrestrictive license165 to a potential infringer without being
guilty of patent misuse.166 For example, a patentee may provide an expensive patented machine at some low fixed cost,
perhaps zero, but charge per use directly or through a counting
mechanism such as through the concurrent selling at a markup
of some low cost but unique input.167
165. An unrestrictive license allows the licensee to practice the invention
free from suit for infringement by the patentee. A restrictive license gives less
than such unlimited permission, such as by restricting the amount or type of
use.
166. Inducement of infringement and contributory infringement are collectively referred to as two forms of indirect infringement because under both
causes of action the defendant is accountable as an infringer for acts of infringement by third parties. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (codifying the cause of action for inducement of infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (codifying the cause of
action for contributory infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (codifying the rule
that a patentee may elect to license direct or indirect infringers without committing patent misuse); see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 894-1030.
167. Such a “counters” argument was successfully made to Chief Circuit
Judge Lurton by Frederick P. Fish (founding partner of the firm Fish,
Richardson & Neave, predecessor to the two firms Fish & Richardson and Fish
& Neave) in the Button Fastener Case, and ultimately led to the opinion by
Justice Lurton (the same man) in the A.B. Dick case, also argued by Fish. See
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288
(6th Cir. 1896) (the “Button Fastener Case”); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1 (1912). The “counters” argument offered the unpatented staples sold by the
patentee at a substantial profit as convenient proxies used to count the number of infringing uses by purchasers of the patented stapling machine—which
was sold by the patentee at or below cost. See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
241, 246-60 (1942) (citing Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (opinion by Lurton, C.J.) (the “Button
Fastener Case”), and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (opinion by
Lurton, J.)).
Dissenting in Brulotte v. Thys from the holding that a patentee engages in
misuse if he charges royalties that extend beyond the patent term, Justice
Harlan provided a pointed example demonstrating the mutual gains from
trade that are available in such a transaction:
At the time when the Thys patent term still has a few years to run, a
farmer who has been picking his hops by hand comes into the Thys
retail outlet to inquire about the mechanical pickers. The salesman
concludes his description of the advantages of the Thys machine with
the price tag$20,000. Value to the farmer depends completely on
the use he will derive from the machine; he is willing to obligate himself on long credit terms to pay $10,000, but unless the machine can
substantially outpick his old hand-picking methods, it is worth no
more to him. He therefore offers to pay $2,000 down, $400 annually
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The rules for determining patentability are clear. To be
patentable, an invention must be new.168 It must also be
nonobvious.169 In addition, the text, or specification of a patent
for 20 years, and an additional payment during the contract term for
any production he can derive from the machine over and above the
minimum amount he could pick by hand. Thys accepts, and by doing
so, according to the majority, commits a per se misuse of its patent. I
cannot believe that this is good law.
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 38 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed,
Justice Harlan’s reasoning demonstrates that the same effect can be achieved
if the parties merely re-label the operative term in their contract from “royalty
payment” to “financing provision” or if they make the exchange appear to be
one in which the patentee is providing some benefit that is in addition to the
patent license, such as a service contract. By giving less, the patentee might
commit misuse.
Justice Robin Jacob has pointed out that a savvy patentee might achieve
the same advantageous result by including a number of successively narrow
claims in the initial patent application. For example, the inventor of a paint
spray gun might also claim the use of the device to spray paint. It would be
much easier for such a patentee to avoid an antitrust tying complaint if he
elected to charge for each use of the device. Robin Jacob, Objectionable Narrowness of Claim, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 974.
For a general criticism of the doctrine of patent misuse, see Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Misuse of Patents or Misuse of Patent and Antitrust Law? Address Before the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American
Bar Association Meeting (Aug. 14, 1974) (transcript on file with author).
168. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). A patent claim is invalid for anticipation under § 102 if any single available item of prior art discloses, either expressly or
inherently, each and every limitation of the claimed invention in a manner
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to reduce the invention to practice.
Thus the famous aphorism: “That which infringes, if later, would anticipate if
earlier.” Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 228 (1893). For a detailed discussion
of the novelty and statutory bar requirements in patent law, see CHISUM ET
AL., supra note 2, at 335-529.
169. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). The legal test for obviousness was articulated
by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966):
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness
of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations
as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.
Id. at 17-18. The relevant inquiry is whether the prior art as a whole suggested the claimed invention, and indicated to a person having ordinary skill
in the art a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention. Obviousness is like anticipation but instead of all elements of the claim
existing in a single item of prior art, the elements may be spread among two or
more pieces of prior art as long as they also provide that a motivation or suggestion to be combined along with a reasonable expectation of success. See In
re Dow Chem. Co. 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For a detailed discus-

KIEFF.FNL

1/15/01 3:35 PM

2001] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RULES

739

must (1) include a written description of the invention, (2) instruct as to the construction and use of the invention, (3) divulge what the inventor considers the best way to use the invention, and (4) conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the process or thing patented.170 The scope of the patent’s right to exclude is set by the
claim (or claims).171
The present crispness did not always exist for the patent
system. Before the 1952 Patent Act, codified as Title 35 of the
United States Code, the patent system was much different. On
April 29, 1938, addressing a joint session of Congress, President Roosevelt requested a thorough study of what he described
as a “concentration of economic power.”172 Congress responded
by creating the Temporary National Economic Committee
(“TNEC”), the purpose of which was to study “monopoly and the
concentration of economic power . . . with a view to determining . . . [inter alia] the effect of existing . . . patent, and other
Government policies upon competition, price levels, unemployment, profits and consumption.”173
What followed was the gradual but systematic erosion of
patent rights throughout the courts. By the late 1940s courts
were on average applying a substantially more stringent, but
difficult to discern, test for “invention” when deciding issues of
validity.174 The nature of the test was aptly described in the
sion of the nonobviousness requirement, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at
530-728. For an excellent exposition of the history of the requirement, see
George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, The Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 458-87 (1999).
170. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). For a detailed review of the disclosure requirements, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 155-334.
171. As Judge Rich stated,
The U.S. is strictly an examination country and the main purpose of
the examination, to which every application is subjected, is to try to
make sure that what each claim defines is patentable. To coin a
phrase, the name of the game is the claim . . . [and] the function of
claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes the patent and what does not.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (quoting Giles Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation
of ClaimsAmerican Prospectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 497, 499, 501 (1990)).
172. S. DOC. NO. 75-173, at 7 (1938).
173. S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong. § 2 (1938).
174. See Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intentor, Who Wrote the Patent Act
of 1952?, reprinted in NONOBVIOUSNESSTHE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF
PATENTABILITY 1:1, 1:3 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) [hereinafter
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remarks of Justice Jackson in a 1949 dissent: “[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get
its hands on.”175 In addition, the Supreme Court had virtually
eliminated the doctrine of contributory infringement through
aggressive use of antitrust principles and the related doctrine
of patent misuse.176 Earlier, the doctrine of contributory infringement, and the corresponding ability of patentees to elect
to license potential contributory infringers, were available tools
for facilitating the type of tie-in price discrimination suggested
by Demsetz.177
Heady with success in implementing the Lanham Trademark Act a few years earlier, in 1948, the New York Patent
Law Association enlisted Giles Rich to draft for introduction in
Congress a bill178 to revive contributory infringement and two
other bills179 to establish a more definite test for what constitutes an “invention.”180 Legislative efforts continued into subsequent Congresses, leading to the formation of a National Coordinating Committee and a two-man Drafting Committee,
including Rich, and producing extensive congressional testimony from representatives of diverse groups, again including
Rich, as representative of the Bar.181 The result was the 1952
Act, which substantially remains as the controlling patent law
today.182 As the Supreme Court expressly recognized almost
NONOBVIOUSNESS].
175. Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
176. See NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174, at 1:3. The doctrines of inducement of infringement and contributory infringement hold a defendant accountable as an infringer for acts of infringement by third parties. See supra
note 166. By the late 1940s, the court had effectively eliminated contributory
infringement by holding that such suits improperly extended the patent beyond the scope of the claims, thereby constituting misuse of the patent. See
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174, at 1:3 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 129-38.
178. H.R. 5988, 80th Cong. (1948).
179. H.R. 4061, 80th Cong. (1948); H.R. 5248, 80th Cong. (1948).
180. See NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174, at 1:3.
181. See id. at 1:3-1:10.
182. A great deal has been written about the history of the 1952 Patent
Act. An extensive discussion of the history and impact of the Act can be found
in Dawson Chem. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176 (1980), which found no misuse where the holder of a patent on the method of using a chemical as a herbicide charges customers above market price for the chemical itself and sues
competing chemical company for contributory infringement. See id. at 223; see
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thirty years later in an opinion quoting extensively from the
Rich testimony, § 271 of the Act revived contributory infringement through its inclusion of express provisions for contributory infringement and inducement of infringement and of express statements about what shall not constitute misuse.183
Especially when seen in such context, the plain wording of
the 1952 Act shows a clear shift towards a patent system
marked by more certain and effective patent rights. Indeed,
the importance of commercialization to the members of the
Patent Bar in general, and to Giles Rich, is clearly evidenced by
other writings from the time. As part of a competition sponsored by the Linthicum Foundation and chaired by Dean Wigmore, Rich wrote what became a five-part series of articles on
the relationship between patent and antitrust laws.184 In this
series, Rich expressly set forth a commercialization theory of
the patent system.185 In doing so, he provided several detailed
examples of the underuse problem associated with the lack of
property rights.186 It is immediately recognizable that these
problems of underuse are caused by the inability to concentrate
benefits and costs on owners, as described almost thirty years
later by Demsetz.187

also NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174. West published the Congressional
Committee Reports on the 1952 Patent Act in its original annotated version of
Title 35. The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is republished along
with the original commentary by Pasquale “Pat” Federico, the Patent Office’s
liaison to the Drafting Committee and representative at legislative hearings
on the Act, in 75 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 157 (1993).
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)-(d); see also Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 206-07
(quoting extensively from and basing decision upon testimony of Giles Rich).
For a discussion focused on the history, architecture, and operation of § 271,
see Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 476 (1953), and Giles S. Rich, Recollections of Writing 35
USC 271, Address at the John Marshall Conference (1981).
184. See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the AntiMonopoly Laws (pts. 1-5), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942)
[hereinafter Rich, The Relation Between Practices and the Anti-Monopoly
Laws]. Rich tells the story of the competition in his famous acceptance speech
for the Kettering Award, Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as
Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855 (1964)
[hereinafter Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention”], which provided the
framework for the test of nonobviousness adopted by the Supreme Court in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
185. See generally Rich, The Relation Between Practices and the AntiMonopoly Laws, supra note 184.
186. See id.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.

KIEFF.FNL

742

1/15/01 3:35 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:697

Rich began his discussion of patent theory by marginalizing theories of the patent system based on rewards as incentives to invent or disclose because they both focus “primarily
with reference to the ‘inventor’ as though he were the principal
character in this economic drama. We think this is a great mistake. He may be an essential party but the emphasis should be
placed elsewhere.”188
Instead, Rich suggested that focus should be placed on a
third theory:
The third aspect of inducement is by far the greatest in practical importance. It applies to the inventor but not solely to him, unless he is
his own capitalist. . . . It might be called the inducement to risk an
attempt to commercialize the invention. It is the “business” aspect of
the matter which is responsible for the actual delivery of the invention into the hands of the public.189

Rich proceeded to quote at length from an editorial in Business
Week that described the costs and risks of commercialization.190
He continued by quoting from another editorial in Business
Week that described a new plastic made from sawdust developed by the United States Forest Service. The plastic made
from sawdust was licensed freely and nonexclusively for the
use of all, and as a result, it was not further developed.191
He then cited a more pointed example from the health care
industry of the inventor of a new wheelchair, who, thinking to
give it to the world for free, did not patent it: “The result was
that no manufacturer dared risk undertaking its manufacture.
Each knew that if it succeeded, competitors would spring up
and rob him of most or all of his profits, while, on the other
hand, it might fail.”192 Rich then quoted from the Patent Commissioner’s testimony before the TNEC which asserted: “I think
I can present to you indisputable evidence that speculative
capital will not back new inventions without the patent protection. And in the final analysis this is the crux and the most
important thing in the whole patent question.”193
188. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly
Laws, supra note 184, at 175.
189. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
190. See id. at 178 (quoting Editorial, BUS. WK., Mar. 23, 1940, at 55).
191. See id. at 178-79 (quoting Editorial, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 1939, at 29).
192. Id. at 179 (quoting Forkosch, The Economics of American Patent Law,
Contemp. Law. Pamph., Ser. 4, No. 2, at 21 (citing ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS 331 (1913))).
193. Id. at 180 (quoting TNEC Hearings, pt. 3, 857-58 (1939) (statement of
Conrad P. Coe, Commissioner of Patents), reprinted in 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
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A few years later, in an unpublished manuscript, Rich
again explained that patents provide an incentive to invest risk
capital for commercialization, which he considered to be “usually the most expensive part of the long haul from the mental
conception of the invention to the delivery of something useful
into the hands of the consumer.”194
Rich also pointed out the importance of patent law’s rules
for determining what inventions should be patentable. He explained that the legal rules work together with technological
facts knowable to all at the time a patent application is filed to
make this determination automatic. As he put it,
All the talk about the strength and weakness of patents per se borders
on gobbledygook until we learn to comprehend the riddle that: The
stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger
it is. To explain, a patent that is strong in that it contains broad
claims which adequately protect the invention so they are hard to design around is weak in that it may be easier to invalidate and is
therefore less likely to stand up in court because the claims are more
likely to read on prior art or be broader than the disclosed invention,
and for other reasons defense lawyers can devise. On the other hand,
the patent with narrow claims of the kind the Patent Office readily allows quickly without a contest is weak as protection and as incentive
to invest but strong in that a court will not likely invalidate it.195

Indeed, the other major improvement included in the 1952 Act
was the introduction of the nonobviousness requirement as an
objective test for patentability, in addition to simple novelty,
and instead of the more nebulous requirement that to be patentable the invention had to involve “invention.”196
Curiously, the TNEC testimony from Commissioner Coe is
also quoted in the article that won the prize from the Linthi87, 117-18 (1939)).
194. Giles S. Rich, Patents Are Bait 11 (Dec. 1945) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (citing Judge Frank concurring with an opinion by
Judge Hand in Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir.
1942)).
195. Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (responding to proposed legislation S.
1042 and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and Report of the President’s
Commission on the Patent System (1966)). Grady and Alexander have further
endeavored to show how courts have applied these rules in decisions that provide incentives to minimize inefficient rent-seeking—and thereby rentdissipating—behavior, thereby more efficiently organizing efforts to invent
and commercialize among competitors in markets for such activities over time.
See Grady & Alexander, supra note 66, at 316-21.
196. Not only was the requirement for invention nebulous, it was patently
absurd, especially to the uninitiated. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 403 (1960).
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cum Foundation.197 In the foreword to the winning article,
Dean Wigmore injects what he calls his “personal opinion that
neither Courts nor treatise-writers have been radical enough in
defending the legitimacy of the ‘monopoly’ in a patent, as distinguished from the ordinary trade-monopoly,” and that he regards it as “unfortunate that courts and treatise-writers have
not stood up more boldly for the fundamental right-ness of the
patent-right itself.”198
Rich was not the only one to appreciate the importance of
patents. Other commentators before the 1952 Act were even
able to envision the more modern vision, today often associated
with Schumpeter,199 that paradoxically, a patent in the hands
of a market challenger may evoke competition against a huge
industrial monopolist. According to Judge Frank, in this context the David Co. v. Goliath, Inc., competition is dependant
upon investment in David Co., which will not occur unless it is
armed with the patent slingshot.200 Rich later asserted this
view of patents as potential antimonopoly agents in his commentary on proposed patent legislation.201 Today, such a view
of patents may help explain why the inability to receive patent
protection for software for such a large and important portion
of the industry’s life may have contributed to the continued unchallenged dominance of a huge entity like Microsoft.202
197. LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 20 (1941).
198. John H. Wigmore, Foreword to LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND
ANTITRUST LAW vii-viii (1941).
199. See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 53, at 61-94; SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 53, at 81-110; SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES, supra
note 4, at 84-192.
200. See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir.
1942) (Frank, J. concurring).
201. See Rich, supra note 195, at 651 (responding to proposed legislation S.
1042 and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and Report of the President’s
Commission on the Patent System (1966)).
202. Early in the rise of the software industry, Judge Rich attempted on
several occasions to strike down legal rules against patenting of computer programs. Throughout the 1970s, he sent numerous cases to the Supreme Court
to no avail. See generally CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 763-72, 788-813 (reviewing efforts by Judge Rich to elucidate flaws in the Supreme Court’s efforts
to block patents on computer software and subsequent appeals to the Supreme
Court in those cases, eventually leading to a shift in the Court’s views to now
allow such protection). Finally, perhaps due in part to a shift in makeup of the
Court, he began to have success in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), but
it was not until In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), and
perhaps even State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999), that the
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This controversy over the use of patents to protect subject
matter such as living organisms, gene fragments, computer
software, and financial services relates to perceived changes in
the law governing the threshold patentability requirements of
utility and statutory subject matter.203 The claimed invention
must fall within at least one of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter: products or processes.204 Although interpreted expansively to “include anything under the sun that
is made by man,”205 these classes do not encompass everything.
A common limit on each class is the well-established aphorism
that ideas or laws of nature are not patentable subject matter:
though Einstein might have been able to patent a method of
2
converting mass into energy, his law E = mc , in and of itself, is
not patentable.206 This takes us back to the utility requirement.207 As long as it is claimed in such a way that it performs
some useful, concrete, or tangible result, almost any process
will at least satisfy the threshold requirements of utility and
statutory subject matter.208

market fully responded to the availability of patent protection.
203. See supra note 9.
204. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Section 101 actually sets forth four specific
categories—processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of
matter—but law and practice have long treated the last three together as
products.
205. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Committee
Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)
and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,
961 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich, J.) (citing the same Committee Report for the
proposition that patentable subject matter “may include anything under the
sun . . . made by man” (emphasis added)).
206. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-91. For a detailed review of the requirement for statutory subject matter, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 752893.
207. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). For a detailed review of the utility requirement, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 729-51.
208. See State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (holding the hub and spoke mutual
fund accounting system to be patent eligible subject matter because the data it
manipulates and produces both correspond to and cause something concrete
and tangible: a share price, which is money). Although traditional examples of
patented inventions include machines and chemicals, it is the more controversial subjects such as genes and gene products, computer software, financial
services, and business methods that have spurred on much of the recent criticism facing patent law. Although at one time hotly debated, it is currently
settled as a matter of positive law that protection is available in each of these
areas. To be sure, the normative debate survives, and indeed thrives. See,
e.g., supra text accompanying note 9.
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What emerges from this review of the writings of those involved in framing our current patent system is that the commercialization theory’s link among patents, property rights,
and price discrimination clearly operated to inform and motivate their efforts to frame the system. They viewed patents
first as incentives to commercialize nascent inventions.209 They
recognized that patent rights must be set by clear rules of law
governing validity and infringement.210 And they were deeply
motivated by a desire to revive the patentee’s ability to use
price discrimination by electing to offer either restricted or unrestricted licenses to anyone who would otherwise be subject to
suit for direct or indirect infringement.211 They also recognized
the importance of patents as potential tools for avoiding or
challenging monopolies.212
209. See supra text accompanying notes 188-198. This particular aspect of
the commercialization view, along with use of the word “commercialization,”
has begun to resurface over the past twenty years in statutes, legislative hearings, and statements by judges. For example, the Bayh-Dole Act, passed in
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018-28, § 6(a) (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)), encourages universities to seek and
retain patent rights on the results of federally funded research for the express
purpose of using “the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research or development . . . [and] to promote
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United
States.” 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994) (stating the purposes of the act). Similarly, in
hearings leading up to the Bayh-Dole Act, Harry F. Manbeck, who subsequently became Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office, argued
that “[u]nless the universities get substantial rights from patents, there is absolutely no incentive for them to establish technology transfer and patent programs which may lead to commercialization of the research.” Patent Policy:
Hearings on S.1215 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong. 302
(1979) (statement of H.F. Manbeck, Jr., General Patent Counsel, General
Electric Co.). See also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Newman, J., concurring) (“What seems to be missing in our country is an understanding that, no matter how much money we spend on research and development, the findings are not going to benefit the public unless there are
suitable incentives to invest in commercialization. That means a chance of
reasonable profits from risk taking and a chance to hold onto one’s original
ideas once they are created” (quoting approvingly Irving S. Shapiro, Address
Before the Economic Club of Detroit (1979), in XLV VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY 360, 364 (1979))); Foreword, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at iii (consisting of statement by Judge Giles S. Rich that probably the most important
function of the patent system is “to encourage the investment of risk capital in
the commercialization of inventions so that the public gets to enjoy the benefits thereof”).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 178-87, 195-96.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67, 178-83.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
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IV. COMMERCIALIZATION AND THE MODERN
PATENT SYSTEM
The commercialization view of patents helps explain many
controversial trends in the current patent system, including
those that sparked the recent critical commentary.213 Under
this view, the increases in predictability in patent litigation
and certainty in patent law that have been attributed to the
creation of the Federal Circuit and areas of that court’s case
law are good things.214 They have helped forge clearly marked
and enforceable property rules for patents.215 Similarly, under
this view, it is also good that patents are now being used to protect subject matter such as living organisms, gene fragments,
computer software, and financial services, which many previously considered to be ineligible for patent protection.216 This
makes sense because some form of protection is necessary to
permit recovery of commercialization costs in markets such as
these,217 precisely because they are characterized by a particularly large difference between average cost and marginal
cost.218 Indeed, the need for protection is especially strong in
markets such as these because commercialization costs represent a significant component of average cost.219
Consider, for example, the topic of patents on financial services. A recent article by Van Zandt suggests that there is
suboptimal innovation in capital markets.220 Van Zandt suggests that at least one of the reasons for suboptimal innovation
213. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
214. See supra text accompanying note 8.
215. See discussion supra Part II.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 203-08.
217. See discussion supra Parts I.A, II.A.
218. Contra SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that
the large difference between average cost and marginal cost for these technologies makes use of patents particularly harmful); KREMER, supra note 11,
at 7 (same). The need for patent protection is strong because first movers in
such markets face high costs of commercialization, whereas second movers
face only low costs of making and selling. See discussion supra Part I.A.
219. In this regard, the commercialization view of patents considers the
growth and survival of a single player with large market power in the software
industrylike Microsoftone of only a few evolutionarily expected outcomes.
Monopoly power provided a method for allowing the firm to recover average
costs in the absence of patent protection. See supra text accompanying note
202.
220. See David Van Zandt, The Organization of Innovation in International
Capital Markets 7-14 (Mar. 22, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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in this market is the high cost of creating a market combined
with the ease of competitive copying.221 He explains that only
the largest few players in the industry regularly bring new
products to market.222 It is not surprising, then, that the commercialization view of patents may provide an easy solution. In
the language of Demsetz, the threat of copying prevents the
small firms from being able to concentrate the benefits of commercialization.223 They therefore elect not to invest in commercialization at all. Only the larger players can afford to invest
the resources to bring such products to market. According to
the commercialization theory, the availability of patent protection may enable small firms to enter the market, and perhaps
even challenge their larger counterparts.224
The commercialization view of patents may also help explain outcomes on recent legislative activity in the patent
arena. For example, efforts to harmonize the U.S. patent system with those of the rest of the world frequently receive substantial attention from Congress and commentators.225 Typical
legislative proposals have included the following: shifting patent term so it is measured as twenty years from earliest filing
date rather than seventeen years from issue date;226 allowing
the filing of provisional patent applications, which would establish a priority date for a low fee but would have to be converted
to a regular application by the applicant in order to be examined;227 the publication of patent applications eighteen months
after filing;228 and moving from a first-to-invent system to a
first-to-file system.229
Those suggested changes that have already been made are
in accord with the commercialization view. Twenty-year-term

221. See id. at 7-11.
222. See id. at 15-19.
223. See discussion supra Part II.A.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
225. See, e.g., Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, S. 2605, 102d Cong.
(1992), H.R. 4978, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act of
1992]; Edward G. Fiorito, The “Basic Proposal” for Harmonization of U.S. and
World-Wide Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y. 83 (1991) (summarizing harmonization efforts of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations).
226. See Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 § 6.
227. See id. § 4.
228. See id.
229. See id. § 3.
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and provisional applications were passed into law in 1994.230
Eighteen-month-publication was passed into law in 1999.231
Under the commercialization view, the shift in patent term can
be seen as an aid in clearing the patent register.232 Similarly,
eighteen-month-publication can be seen as an important signaling tool for controlling the potential rent-seeking, and therefore
rent-dissipating, behavior of those who would be lured into doing inventive effort by the potential profits from a patent.233
In contrast, the shift from a first-to-invent system to a
first-to-file system has not yet been implemented and may not
be in accord with the commercialization view. In the existing
U.S. patent system, when two or more patent applications or
patents claim the same invention, or an application is filed
claiming the same invention as a recently issued patent, the
Patent and Trademark Office will commence an interference
proceeding to determine priority of invention.234 Under a firstto-file system, priority is awarded to the application that is
filed first, regardless of priority of invention.235 Much of the

230. See supra note 164 (citing Pub L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994));
see also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (term); 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (provisional applications).
231. See Pub L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
232. See also supra text accompanying notes 159-60. In addition, Congress
has established an inter partes reexamination procedure with participation by
third parties (other than the Patent Office and the patentee) for administrative adjudication of the validity of issued patents by the Patent Office as a less
costly alternative to proceeding in Federal Court. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501A-567-71 (1999). This new reexamination procedure may enhance
the policing role played by competitors of the patentee. See discussion supra
Part I.B.
233. See, e.g., Grady & Alexander, supra note 66, at 314-16 (discussing the
principals of “signaling,” which leads to races for patents and rent dissipation);
see also supra text accompanying notes 66-67 (noting concern about potential
rent-seeking behavior at the pre-invention stage).
234. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (1999); 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994). The second
party to file (the junior party) has the burden of proving prior invention by a
preponderance of the evidence. Priority of invention is determined pursuant
to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The first party to conceive of the invention will win the interference if she is also the first to reduce the invention
to practice. If she is not the first to reduce to practice, she will win the interference only if she can prove diligence in her efforts to reduce the invention to
practice. Reduction to practice may be either actual or constructive, through
the filing of a patent application. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 715.07 (7th ed. 1998). The interference practice resulting from §
102(g) is the basis for the so-called “first-to-invent” aspect of the United States
patent system. For more on the priority of invention and interferences, see
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 485-529.
235. See Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 § 3.
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debate236 over first-to-file versus first-to-invent can be seen in
context of the general debate over rules versus standards, fairness versus certainty, and efficiency.237 The incentive to commercialize theory may, however, provide special insight for resolving the particular debate applied to patents. While one
contestant may emerge holding the property right from a priority dispute under a first-to-invent system, a first-to-file system
may be more likely to yield no property right at all.238 The increased incentive to file early under a first-to-file system, as
compared with a first-to-invent system, may lead to an increase
in the number of patents being held invalid for inadequate disclosure in their underlying applications, thereby diminishing
incentives to engage in commercialization activities.239 The incentive to commercialize view thus helps explain the persistence of the existing first-to-invent regime.
236. See generally Patent Harmonization Act of 1992: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978, 102d Cong.
(1992) (collecting testimony and sources on both sides of the debate).
237. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
15-64 (1987) (discussing the rules versus standards debate in the context of
general legal systems and arenas).
238. To be sure, patentability or validity issues can be raised in priority
disputes under both systems; the operative distinction here is that first-to-file
systems may give rise to increased validity problems.
239. A hastily filed application is more likely to be found invalid for nonenablement or lack of written description under recent Federal Circuit case
law. See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-18 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (applying the statutory requirement that the text of the patent application as filed contain sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art to make and
use whatever is covered by patent claims as eventually issued and applying
separate written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkur, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-67 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that the statute also requires the text of the patent application as
filed to satisfy the separate and distinct written description requirement so as
to reasonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the patent
claims as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-18 (applying separate written description requirement to claims in the field of
biotechnology); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(solidifying the court’s position on a separate written description requirement);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (further solidifying the court’s position on a separate written
description requirement); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the same written description requirement to the
field of computer software); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d
1437, 1479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (indicating that the written description
requirement is not limited to complex technologies but applies equally to
simple technologies, like sofa recliners); see also supra text accompanying
notes 115, 170.
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V. COMMERCIALIZATION AND THE MODERN
TRADEMARK SYSTEM
The commercialization theory of patent law may also help
explain controversial aspects of trademark law. Consider, for
example, a trademark that has become so well known, consumers now view it as a distinct good or service. Consider that
some consumers may even like it so much that they use it as
decoration. It cannot be that every customer who buys a
Mickey Mouse shirt supposes that the quality of the shirt owes
anything to Walt Disney Productions. Even if the consumers
think there is some licensing arrangement between the shirt
seller and Disney, that arrangement may be irrelevant to the
decision to buy.
To make the case stronger, consider the argument by Kozinski about T-shirts bearing a New York Mets logo, in which he
urges that a fan has a strong claim to express team admiration,
and an even stronger claim to express team criticism.240 From
there, he adds, it is only a small step to say that the fan ought
to be able to pay someone to stencil the shirt professionally.241
In a recent tribute symposium to the late Ralph Brown,
Lemley and Litman argued that any trend in trademark law
that permits the propertization of trademarkssuch as the
merchandizing right in the sports contextis simply an improper use of the law of trademarks.242 For them, the touchstones and the limits of trademark theory are designations of
source and confusion.243 Lemley asserts that “it does not follow

240. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960,
976 (1993). For example, team admiration might be expressed by the wearing
of a T-shirt bearing just the logo, or the logo preceded by the slogan “up with.”
Team criticism might be expressed by wearing a T-shirt bearing a defaced
logo, or a logo preceded by the slogan “down with,” or some inelegant version
thereof.
241. Id.
242. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1705-09 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1687,
1717, 1728-31 (1999).
243. See Lemley, supra note 242, at 1705-09. Lemley intimates reasoning
similar to Kozinski, supra note 240: a fan or critic who is merely interested in
speaking about the Mets cannot be confused about source because source is
irrelevant to the decision to buy the shirt. The purpose of buying the shirt for
such an owner is to speak about the team. Indeed, the presence of a licensing
arrangement behind the shirt sale might undermine the rhetoric of, or even
offend, the speaker if the message of the speech is critical of the team.
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that because something is valuable it must be owned.”244 Further, in an article that bears the running title “Breakfast with
Batman,” Litman urges, “An argument that we would have an
undersupply of good commercials . . . cannot be made with a
straight face.”245
At least the beginnings of the counterargument are found
in the trademark dispute over Batman himself in the 1982 DC
Comics case.246 There, Judges Rich and Nies began by pointing
out that there is not, and should not be, any principle of trademark law that requires imposition of a penalty for the originality, creativeness, attractiveness, uniqueness, or even fame of
one’s product, or that requires a holding that the unique design
or other features of a product cannot also function as a designation of source.247 They note that the opposite rule
has led some courts into an esoteric and extraneous inquiry focusing
on what motivates the purchasing public to buy particular goods, the
product itself or the source. . . . The reason the public is motivated to
buy the product . . . is of concern to market researchers but is legally
immaterial to the issue of whether a particular designation is generic.248

They do recognize the safeguard that trademark
“[p]rotectibility is lost when the public uses what was a proper
name [the mark] to denominate like or similar goods from other
sources as well.”249 Yet they conclude that “it would be unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which
would transform an ordinary product into one of grace.”250
Restructuring the discussion into the framework of Demsetz, the question is not whether we will see a decrease in
commercialsalthough fans of Superbowl commercials may
feel otherwisebut, rather, whether we will see a decrease in
the development of highly popular marks. Underlying the reasoning of Judges Rich and Nies is a recognition that trademark
rights in such marks encourage firms to invest in promoting
new highly entertaining marks in an effort to make them popular. As Landes and Posner noted, if appropriation is forbidden
by a property rule, the benefits of such popularization will be
244. Lemley, supra note 242, at 1709.
245. Litman, supra note 242, at 1730.
246. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1046-55 (Fed. Cir. 1982)
(opinions of Judge Rich and Judge Nies concurring separately in result).
247. Id. at 1053.
248. Id. at 1054.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1050.
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internalized to mark owners and the amount of investing in potentially famous marks will rise.251 Although this may seem
frivolous to some, the audience who makes it happen must feel
otherwise. After all, they will have devoted the attention necessary to make the mark so valuable. Indeed, this may cause
some in the audience to argue that it is precisely because of this
investment on their part that ownership, if there is any, lies
entirely with them.252 It would run afoul of basic principles of
capitalism, however, to suggest that the requirement to pay for
a good should evaporate simply because a consumer has developed a particularly strong interest in the good—particularly if
it is a luxury good.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a new view of the patent system in
which a central goal is to facilitate commercialization of new
goods and services. Under this view, treatment of patents as
property rights provides incentives for the investment and ordering of private activities necessary for such a complex commercialization process while at the same time providing a
workable framework for deciding which inventive activities
merit government intervention in the first instance. According
to this view, patents can promote commercialization without
creating dead-weight loss through the use of price discrimination and strict and clearly marked property rules. In this regard, this Article provides a moral realist or natural law view
of the patent system as a legal regime getting it right.
This Article also demonstrates how the link among patents, property rights, and commercialization informed the creation of our current patent system. The offered view of the system may help explain many controversial trends, including
those that sparked recent critical commentary, as well as those
in other areas of intellectual property law, such as trademarks.
This Article therefore simultaneously provides support for the
present patent system under three additional philosophical
views. Under an intentionalist view, the system we have today
is in keeping with the intent of those who framed it. Under a
positivist view, the system we have today is in keeping with the
system as created. Under a legal realist view, the system we
251. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 304 (1988).
252. See Litman, supra note 242, at 1730.
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have today is in keeping with the goals of the winning side in
the contest surrounding its creation.
The commercialization theory offered in this Article shows
how disparate features of the existing patent systempreviously thought to be unrelated or mutually antitheticalactually operate together to effectively promote invention
commercialization. While endeavoring to answer Dean Wigmore’s request for someone to stand up more boldly for the
rightness of the patent system,253 this Article has also provided
a new and useful framework for studying the operation of the
system and for testing proposed changes or alternatives.

253. See Wigmore, supra note 198.

